

Book Reviews

Thomas U. Berger, Mike M. Mochizuki, and Jistuo Tsuchiyama, eds., *Japan in International Politics: The Foreign Policies of an Adaptive State*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2007. 349 pp. \$24.50.

Reviewed by Hugo Dobson, University of Sheffield

In 1993 when two Japanese nationals were killed in Cambodia while assisting the United Nations mission to rebuild that unfortunate country, Junichiro Koizumi, then minister of postal service and telecommunications and later more famously prime minister of Japan, stated that although the kind of contribution Japan should make to the international community had been debated at length, nobody ever imagined that blood would have to be shed in the process. He urged the government to withdraw Japanese personnel from the peacekeeping operation on the grounds that Japan was a special case. A decade later, Koizumi was the driving force behind a significant expansion in the scale and nature of Japan's international contribution to the "Coalition of the Willing" in and around both Afghanistan and Iraq.

This vignette demonstrates the dramatic change in attitudes within Japan to the country's engagement with the outside world. During the Cold War, it was "hard to think of another major country that has pursued a more successful foreign policy—one that brought prosperity and security for its own citizens with minimal costs" (p. 1). However, in the immediate post-Cold War period, Japan was severely criticized for its perceived free riding and inability to contribute appropriately to the international community. The notion of Japan's "international contribution" provides the particular focus of this book, which results from a joint project of the Japan Forum on International Relations and the Brookings Institution. The initial findings were to be published in 2001, but in response to the events of 9/11 the original publication plans were postponed so that the impact of those events could be brought into the analysis. This was a sensible decision.

At the turn of the millennium a steady stream of textbooks and research monographs were produced on Japan's international relations., in contrast to the trickle of scholarship that had existed previously. This flood of scholarship highlighted a number of emerging trends that have come more clearly into relief since September 2001. As a result of the decision to reorient the original project and engage with these trends, this welcome collection of essays distinguishes itself from several competing volumes.

The contributors represent some of the leading scholars currently working in the United States and Japan, and the editors have structured their chapters in a logical

Journal of Cold War Studies

Vol. 12, No. 1, Winter 2010, pp. 166–213

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fashion. In addition to introductory and concluding chapters, the book is divided into three major sections that explore Japan's international contribution—positive or negative—in the areas of security, economics, and regional diplomacy. The section on Japan's security policy addresses proposals to revise the war-renouncing Article 9 of the Japanese constitution, participation in United Nations peacekeeping operations, and an alternative defense posture for multilateral security. The section on economic relations deals with Japan's responses to changes in the global economic environment, its role in the construction of stable international financial relations, and its response to the East Asian economic and financial crisis of 1997–1998. Finally, the section on regional diplomacy highlights collective war memory and the “history problem” in Japan's relations with its East Asian neighbors, Japan's relations with Burma on the question of human rights, and the rise of China.

As is always the case with edited volumes, the book is something of a curate's egg; however, three chapters are particularly edifying. The introductory chapter by Mike Mochizuki provides the necessary context to discuss the expansion of Japan's international contribution and highlights the tensions between internationalism and nationalism on the one hand and alliance with the United States and autonomy on the other. Chapter 2, by Kohno Masaru, emphasizes the importance of the domestic sources that have actively facilitated, or at least allowed, Japan's expanded international contributions. These include the changing preferences and strategies of the key policymakers and the collapse of the socialist opposition. Finally, the conclusion by Thomas Berger makes sense of the wealth of information contained in the chapters in light of the concept of Japan as an “adaptive state.” In other words, although policymaking in Japan continues to be fragmented and gradual, it is increasingly pluralistic. Moreover, the Japanese state and its people have adapted to the more fluid circumstances of the post–Cold War international environment by creating a liberal consensus about Japan's proper role in the world and embarking on incremental changes that have significantly affected its foreign policy. Edited volumes all too often lack coherence and simply appear as a randomly selected collection of essays. No such accusation can be leveled at this book, which includes a well-written introduction and conclusion that systematically engage with the chapters.

My only criticisms are of a mostly trivial nature and in no way deflect from the worth of this book. Unfortunately, a few chapters do not seem to have benefited from the extended gestation period after 9/11 and fail to address changes born of the “war on terror.” In addition, some editorial inconsistencies and typographical errors remain. Finally, a number of other areas—for example, environmental policy—merit a place in the book. One hopes that a further volume will emerge from this project. Despite these minor shortcomings, this book makes an important contribution to the debate on the nature of Japan's foreign policy behavior and will be of interest to students—providing excellent supplementary reading for any course on Japan's international relations—and researchers alike.



Gregg Brazinsky, *Nation Building in South Korea: Koreans, Americans, and the Making of a Democracy*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007. 328 pp. \$45.00.

Reviewed by Robert M. Hathaway, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

Viewed from the perspective of Washington, DC, the Republic of Korea (ROK, or South Korea) is a rare breed: a successful example of nation building. Among the dozens of countries to emerge from colonialism since the end of World War II, the ROK is one of a select few to achieve both economic prosperity and political democracy. How the ROK made the transition from indigence and despotism to pluralism and plenty—and what role the United States played in this journey—is the subject of Gregg Brazinsky's *Nation Building in South Korea*, a welcome addition to the New Cold War History series edited by John Lewis Gaddis.

The success of the Korean experiment was not preordained. Brazinsky cites Odd Arne Westad, who has found that of the more than 30 postcolonial countries in which the United States has intervened since 1945, only South Korea and Taiwan achieved both economic growth and stable democracy. As Brazinsky portrays it, U.S. nation-building and South Korean agency worked in tandem to foster the ROK's postwar evolution. Both elements were key. But South Korean actions and the manner in which South Koreans accepted, rejected, and modified American ideas were the most crucial factors in shaping the country's transformation. South Koreans adapted to U.S. influence "with the same flexibility and creativity that had long marked their dealings with other stronger powers" (p. 7).

Nation Building in South Korea covers the period from the collapse of Japanese colonialism in Korea in 1945 to the end of military rule in 1987 but focuses most heavily on the 1945–1972 period. Throughout these years, U.S. officials attempted to balance their desire for political liberalization in South Korea with their concerns about security and stability and their determination to promote the ROK's economic development. Frequently, when a choice had to be made, security and stability trumped all else. On at least three occasions—1945–1948, 1960–1961, and 1979–1980—U.S. actions "proved vital to the assumption of power by autocrats at the expense of governments or political leaders who enjoyed stronger popular support" (p. 251). Yet, Brazinsky argues, on the first two of these occasions, U.S. support for Syngman Rhee and, later, Park Chung Hee prevented outcomes that would have been even less happy for the ROK.

Some will conclude that Brazinsky is rather too forgiving of U.S. policies that sustained military strongmen in Korea for 40 years. Brazinsky readily concedes that building an anti-Communist bastion on the southern half of the Korean peninsula exacted "an enormous cost" not only from the South Korean people but also from the U.S. architects. "Americans sacrificed not only their lives and resources but also their ideals" in their Korean nation-building project, Brazinsky concludes (p. 40). Still, he adds, "some of the long-term consequences of U.S. actions in South Korea were better than the intentions behind them" (p. 253).

As Brazinsky reminds us, the United States tended to attribute an importance to Korea out of all proportion to its actual size or strength. President Dwight D. Eisenhower warned that to “lose” South Korea “would run the risk of the loss of our entire position in the Far East” (p. 31). In essence, and for neither the first nor the last time, the world’s mightiest power defined its interests in such a manner as to render it vulnerable to the machinations of small countries and petty autocrats. Rhee, Park, Ngo Dinh Diem, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Ferdinand Marcos, Hosni Mubarak, Pervez Musharraf, and others. The list is nearly endless.

Yet for Brazinsky, the ledger has two sides. Although U.S. policies “sometimes inhibited democracy from the top down, American influence worked in other ways to encourage democratization from the bottom up” (p. 255). Some of Brazinsky’s most original work appears in his extensive treatment of U.S. programs, official and private, that sought to build up South Korea’s education system, improve its media, and train bureaucrats and reform-minded technocrats. Brazinsky focuses not simply on Washington officialdom but also on U.S. foundations, church groups, American universities, the Boy Scouts and Girl Scouts, 4-H Clubs, and similar organizations that exposed Koreans to ideas and ideals that whetted a hunger for participatory democracy. These civilian elites nurtured by the United States—students, intellectuals, journalists, and civil servants—became “the vanguard of resistance” to military despotism (p. 11). American nation building “fostered a demand for change that would eventually shake the country out of its economic and political inertia” and usher in first economic development and, somewhat later, political democracy (p. 41).

This is not the story of benefactor and ward, manipulator and manipulated. U.S. influence was “significant but far from determinative” in shaping South Korea’s evolution after 1945. U.S. policymakers were “not solely responsible for either the brutality of the ROK’s military dictators or the eventual triumph of democracy” in the South. “Rather, South Koreans worked within and around the confines of American influence to forge their own destiny” (p. 250).

Ultimately, according to Brazinsky, it was less American diplomacy than Korean actions that produced the vibrant South Korea that overshadows its northern sibling today. This conclusion, ably argued and supported by impressive multinational archival research, should provide a sobering caution to those who seek to use American power to transplant democracy elsewhere around the globe.



Stephen Blackwell, *British Military Intervention and the Struggle for Jordan: King Hussein, Nasser and the Middle East Crisis, 1955–1958*. New York: Routledge, 2009. 254 pp. \$120.00.

Reviewed by Nigel Ashton, London School of Economics and Political Science

The Suez crisis has cast such a long shadow over the history of British involvement in the postwar Middle East that serious scholars have struggled to persuade students and

nonspecialists alike to pay any attention at all to Britain's role in the region after 1956. Stephen Blackwell's study of the circumstances surrounding the British military intervention in Jordan in 1958 is therefore a welcome addition to the now considerable body of scholarly research aimed at illuminating this post-1956 British role. Although Blackwell's book does not change the basic lines of interpretation of the British intervention laid down in earlier works, including my own study, *Eisenhower, Macmillan and the Problem of Nasser* (New York: Macmillan, 1996), it does offer a considerable amount of useful and important detail to flesh out our understanding of British policymaking in the period. Particularly commendable is the fact that Blackwell has mined recently declassified materials at the British National Archives to update his Ph.D. thesis, which was originally completed over a decade ago.

Blackwell argues that the British policymaking establishment harboured competing positions, which he terms "Arabist" and "interventionist." Even after the Suez debacle, the interventionists, who included in their number such powerful figures as the chief of the Imperial General Staff, General Sir Gerald Templer, advocated wide-ranging British operations in the Middle East to extirpate the influence of Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser. When the Iraqi monarchy fell in July 1958, the interventionists seized their opportunity to act. They regarded British military intervention in Jordan as the first stage in a broader operation that would overthrow the revolutionaries in Iraq and perhaps extend to Syria and Egypt.

The "Arabists," meanwhile, who not surprisingly included a number of key Foreign Office officials but also several influential military figures such as the First Sea Lord, Louis Mountbatten, did not believe that Britain possessed the military capabilities to embark on such operations. Moreover, they did not think that military action would be effective either in defeating Nasser or in preserving pro-Western regimes in the region. Rather, the more sophisticated advocates of this position in the Foreign Office, who included the Deputy Under Secretary, Sir Roger Stevens, argued that Britain should recognize that Arab nationalism was an organic movement. Nasser had not created it; nor did he control it. A more effective British strategy would be to use information, propaganda, and persuasion to try to channel Arab nationalist sentiment in directions that were less destructive from the standpoint of British interests in the region.

Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, who ultimately possessed the deciding vote in these debates, was an interventionist by temperament, but an Arabist on reflection. Although he, too, initially saw the intervention in Jordan as priming the pump for broader action in the region, he quickly retreated from this position once it was clear that the Eisenhower administration would not lend its support to a general anti-Nasser campaign. Blackwell concludes that the contemporaneous U.S. intervention in Lebanon was not part of a combined Anglo-American operation. Rather, each power acted for its own reasons, although the British, who lacked the necessary logistical support for their forces in Jordan, required U.S. assistance. In fact, the Eisenhower administration was rightly cautious in its broader approach to the region. As Secretary of State John Foster Dulles candidly admitted, the United States was simply "not sophis-

ticated enough” in its understanding of Iraqi internal politics to contemplate any direct intervention as the situation unfolded.

If there is a weakness in this book, it lies in the fact that the indigenous actors, especially King Hussein of Jordan, emerge as one-dimensional characters. Blackwell did not undertake work in Jordan itself, so he is left largely to formulate the motives and perspectives of the king from British and American sources. Certainly some officials, particularly the British ambassador Charles Johnston, became close to Hussein and sent back illuminating reports about his thinking. But it would have been useful if Blackwell had conveyed more of a sense of the personal impact of the revolution in Iraq, and particularly the murder of Hussein’s cousin Feisal, on the king.

Overall, *British Military Intervention and the Struggle for Jordan* is a judicious, well-written, and thoroughly researched study. Blackwell’s book casts further valuable light on the dynamics of post-Suez British policymaking in the Middle East.



John Rodden, ed., *The Cambridge Companion to George Orwell*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007. xvi + 218 pp.

Reviewed by Paul Hollander, University of Massachusetts at Amherst and Harvard University

If ever there was a true “public intellectual,” it was George Orwell. He undoubtedly would not have liked to be called one inasmuch as “public intellectuals” tend to be a somewhat pompous and self-righteous lot—attributes he detested. Orwell succeeded in becoming passionately involved in public affairs without pontificating. He steered clear of the pretentiousness and self-importance that became a hallmark of many Western intellectuals and especially those who saw themselves as social critics and members of a moralizing elite.

Orwell took stands on a wide variety of issues and was distinguished by a self-evident authenticity. Unlike other socially conscious intellectuals his authenticity was part of his character. He did not have to cultivate it self-consciously. He also managed to combine the personal and political realm without subordinating the former to the latter. His joining the ranks of the homeless and the manual laborers (described in *Down and Out in Paris and London*), and enlisting in the Spanish civil war (chronicled in *Homage to Catalonia*) does not strike the reader as posturing. He simply and naturally acted as his values impelled him to. He was a socialist and critic of capitalism without succumbing to the temptation to idealize and misread the nature of political systems that claimed socialist credentials—in his time only one existed, the Soviet Union.

The literature on Orwell is huge, and readers might wonder whether another volume is needed. The editor of this volume justifies his undertaking by suggesting that the critical literature on Orwell has become highly specialized and “somewhat inaccessible to the nonscholar” and that numerous misconceptions about Orwell remain to

be dispelled. Of the sixteen British and American contributors to this volume, the best known are Bernard Crick, Robert Conquest, Morris Dickstein, and Christopher Hitchens. This is an informative volume that introduces the reader to the varied contributions of Orwell and the divergent assessments of his work. The most important disputes have been political. Did his resolute rejection of Soviet totalitarianism mean that he gave up on all varieties of socialism? Was he right to draw a moral equation between Nazism and Soviet Communism, an equation especially troubling for those on the left. Raymond Williams, among others, mounted his “political attack camouflaged as aesthetic criticism,” as Erica Gottlieb notes.

Although Orwell’s rejection of Soviet Communism did not entail giving up on democratic socialism, he likely would have rejected the Third World Communist systems that emerged after his death. If so, he might have begun to wonder about a theory, and the associated ideals, that resisted all attempts to be realized.

There is little disagreement about the persisting relevance of Orwell’s central ideas, including his staunch rejection of moral relativism. Current-day postmodernists would benefit from recalling Orwell’s critique of those who argue “that since absolute truth is not attainable, a big lie is no worse than a little lie. It is pointed out to us that all historical records are biased and inaccurate, or on the other hand, that modern physics has proved that what seems to us the real world is an illusion, so that to believe in the evidence of one’s senses is simply vulgar philistinism.” As Morris Dickstein puts it, “Orwell treats totalitarianism as the forerunner of what we today think of as postmodern relativism.” It is a matter of historical record that twentieth-century totalitarian systems made the most-determined attacks on the notion of objective truth helped to dehumanize and mistreat vast numbers of people. But one may also argue that totalitarian systems (as well as postmodernist intellectuals) have expediently alternated between relativism and absolutism depending on circumstances.

Orwell was a hard-nosed critic of the kind of idealism that enshrined good intentions without much concern for where they led, as was the case during the 1960s and its aftermath. Orwell wrote: “it would be a mistake to regard the book-trained socialist as a bloodless creature entirely incapable of emotion. Though seldom giving much evidence of affection for the exploited, he is perfectly capable of displaying hatred . . . against the exploiters. Hence the grand old Socialist sport of denouncing the bourgeoisie. It is strange how easily almost any Socialist writer can lash himself into frenzies of rage against the class to which, by birth or adoption, he himself invariably belongs.”

Especially relevant and durable has been Orwell’s preoccupation with the gullibility of intellectuals: Conquest asks: “How could so many educated minds believe all that fantasy and falsification?” Equally durable and instructive has been Orwell’s concern with the misuse of language—a vigorous, ongoing process in our times as well, perpetrated by political propagandists, advertising copywriters and academic intellectuals who cheerfully support restrictions on free speech when called “sensitivity training” or the dumbing down of the curriculum when such efforts are called “multiculturalism” or “inclusiveness.”

In light of these attitudes and inclinations it is not surprising that Orwell has

been “marginalized within our universities,” as Neil McLaughlin observes. Edward Said and Isaac Deutscher, among others, did not care for him. In an all too believable scene brilliantly imagined by Saul Bellow in his *Mr Sammler’s Planet*, the eponymous hero is denounced and derided by a hostile 1960s crowd of students at Columbia University for making favorable references to Orwell in his talk. They considered Orwell “a fink . . . a sick counter-revolutionary.”

Last but not least, despite Orwell’s profound awareness of a wide range of repugnant human attitudes and behaviors that often find expression in political activities, he managed to retain a strong belief in an apolitical human decency. He was more inclined to locate this decency in ordinary people than in the intelligentsia. His acute awareness of the precarious coexistence of good and evil places him among the ranks of the great writers of all times.



Gary Baines and Peter Vale, eds., *Beyond the Border War: New Perspectives on Southern Africa’s Late–Cold War Conflicts*. Pretoria: Unisa Press, 2008. 342 pp.

Reviewed by Claus Kjersgaard Nielsen, University of Aarhus (Denmark)

Beyond the Border War deals with the armed conflicts in southern Africa in the 1970s and 1980s that pitted South Africa against neighboring countries. The South African government was intent on preserving apartheid at home and white rule over present-day Namibia. The Soviet Union provided large-scale support to Angola, and Cuban troops intervened directly on behalf of the Angolan government. The United States, for its part, supported rebels in the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) led by Jonas Savimbi and allied with South Africa. To South Africa, the intervention in Angola and occupation of Namibia amounted to a defensive stand against the tide of decolonization after the collapse of the Portuguese colonial empire in the early 1970s.

In this anthology seventeen scholars from a wide variety of disciplines ranging from history to anthropology to literary analysis present new and to some extent revisionist perspectives on the Border War. Most of the contributions fall within the category of cultural history and deal with discourse, social construction of identities, gender, memory, reconciliation, ideological manipulation, and so on.

As noted by editor Gary Baines, the term “Border War” is both ambiguous and problematic because it implies that the war was fought defensively to protect South Africa’s international borders. In reality, the fighting took place far inside Angolan territory. However, the term does make sense given the volume’s particular focus on white South Africans’ self-perception as fighting a defensive war of regime survival against the threat of Communism and black barbarism. The term also partly explains why South African destabilization efforts in the frontline states other than Angola and Namibia are not discussed in the volume. Regular South African Defence Forces were

not engaged in major military campaigns in places other than Angola and did not occupy foreign territory except in Namibia.

The Cold War played a large part in this border war by offering a setting for geopolitical alignments along Cold War lines. Co-editor Peter Vale shows in his somewhat poorly edited contribution that South Africa's intervention in Angola fitted well into the Cold War discourse and U.S. strategic doctrine. Though a somewhat embarrassing ally to the United States, South Africa was an ideal match for Henry Kissinger's doctrine of politically subcontracting the containment of Communism, as well as for the Reagan administration's policy of supporting anti-Communist forces in the Third World. As Elaine Windrich shows, propaganda from both the United States and South Africa was needed to portray UNITA as a national liberation movement with legitimate claims to represent the people of Angola.

Edgar Dosman addresses the Cuban intervention in an essay about the defense of Cuito Cuanavale in the spring of 1988 that turned the tide of war against South Africa and paved the way for the South African withdrawal from Angola and Namibia and the latter's independence in 1990. By effectively intervening, Cuba succeeded in withdrawing from a civil war with much more honor than the United States was able to in Vietnam or than the Soviet Union later did in Afghanistan. Cuba's intervention was the most important factor contributing to a resolution of the conflict, even though the United Nations (UN) has since taken credit for the peace settlement. Robert Gordon demonstrates that the UN's peacekeeping effort in Namibia was not nearly as successful as later claimed by the UN and that the successful outcome of the transition should be attributed to other factors.

Daniel Conway and Michael Drewett address the issue of conscription for all white South African males, introduced in South Africa in the 1970s. Conway analyzes the increasing resistance to conscription in the 1980's as reflected in the End Conscription Campaign. Drewett demonstrates how propaganda and popular culture aided the conscription efforts by using traditional gender stereotypes to frame the Border War and its support. National military service was constructed in popular culture as a way of protecting families, especially mothers and sisters, and came to be perceived as a rite of passage for young men.

Other contributors analyze literature about and popular presentations of the war. In evaluating the Afrikaaner novel *The Smell of Apples*, by Mark Behr, Monica Popescu exposes the paradox of Afrikaaner nationalism, which equally feared Communist atheism and capitalist debauchery. Discussing the literature on the Border War, the so-called *Grensliteratuur*, Mathilde Rogez examines four novels, and Henriette Roos surveys the whole genre, showing how it is part of a broader genre of modern war literature and how it particularly resonates with the American literature on the Vietnam War.

Heike Bekker reviews three works of Namibian women's literature on the role of the Ovambo people, challenging the official South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO). depiction of their role as pure victims of the liberation war. In reality, some Ovamos took part in war crimes or sided with the South African Defence Forces. This point is strengthened by Justine Hunter, who examines the politics of memory in

postcolonial Namibia. She shows how SWAPO leaders have chosen a strategy of silence and non-remembering with regard to the guerrillas' own war crimes and have emphasized nation-building at the expense of truth-seeking.

Beyond the Border War supplements existing works on this period of South Africa's history by illuminating the cultural dimensions of the war. Rather than analyzing the actual fighting or political decision-making—except for one contribution—this volume shows how the Border War was fought on the South African home front in the 1980s, as well as how present-day, primarily white, South Africans and ordinary Namibians are coping with their violent past.



Stefan Karner and Othmar Pickl, eds., *Die Rote Armee in der Steiermark: Sowjetische Besetzung 1945*. Graz: Leykam 2008, 462 pp. €29.90.

Reviewed by Günter Bischof, CenterAustria, University of New Orleans

When the Cold War ended, German scholars quickly jumped on the numerous East German and Soviet records to write the history of the Soviet occupation zone in postwar Germany. Austrian scholars initially were more lackadaisical in writing the history of the Soviet occupation zone in postwar Austria, but by 2005 they had caught up. In that “memory year”—60 years after the end of World War II and the liberation of Austria and 50 years after the signing of the Austrian State Treaty—a number of remarkable studies appeared that finally shed light on Soviet occupation policies in Austria.

Two principal research teams were at work in the Moscow archives. The team around Stefan Karner and Barbara Stelzl-Marx at the Ludwig Boltzmann Institute for the Study of Consequences of War, headquartered in Graz, published a massive two-volume study (a volume of key documents reprinted in Russian and translated into German and a volume of essays) in the spring of 2005 on the Red Army in Austria, *Die Rote Armee in Österreich: Sowjetische Besetzung 1945–1955*. In the fall of 2005 a team organized by the Austrian Academy of Sciences published a Russian-German volume of documents (Wolfgang Müller, Arnold Suppan, Norman M. Nairmark, and Gennadij Bordjugov, eds., *Sowjetische Politik in Österreich: Dokumente aus russischen Archiven*). The two groups evidently did not coordinate with each other, and *Sowjetische Politik in Österreich* reprinted and retranslated key documents that had already appeared in *Die Rote Armee in Österreich*. The Austrian Academy also organized a huge state treaty anniversary conference and presented the papers to the public in a splendid scholarly volume (Arnold Suppan, Gerald Stourzh, and Wolfgang Müller, eds., *The Austrian State Treaty: International Strategy, Legal Relevance, National Identity*). Wolfgang Müller, a young Vienna-based Soviet specialist who was the workhorse in the Academy's project, also published his dissertation at that time, *Die sowjetische Besetzung in Österreich 1945–1955 und ihre politische Mission* (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2005). Taken together these weighty

volumes present a much clearer picture of Soviet political policies during the Austrian occupation. They demonstrate that Moscow never planned to take over Austria. In fact, in the late 1940s the Soviet Union had to restrain the aggressive Austrian Communist Party, which would have liked nothing better than the division of Austria and Communist control of the Soviet occupation zone in eastern Austria. The picture of Soviet economic policies in the exploitation of its zone is less clear and awaits further study.

The volume under review here contains 129 translated documents, mostly from former Soviet archives and a few from Bulgarian repositories, and originates with the Graz research team. The book is dedicated to the short-lived occupation of East Styria by the Soviet Army supplemented by Bulgarian auxiliary forces. The Red Army drove the Germans out of this area in April 1945 after the liberation of Hungary and adjacent eastern Austria, having rolled inexorably westward and southwestward into adjoining areas until the war ended in early May. At the end of the war the Soviet occupation of East Styria was not planned but unfolded when armies filled power vacuums left by Adolf Hitler's collapsing Third Reich. Once the Red Army was in place, Stalin used it as a bargaining chip. The threat by the Yugoslav leader, Josip Broz Tito, to seize territory in southern Styria and Carinthia also hovered over the great-power politics in this area. The great powers had agreed by the spring of 1945 that Styria would become part of the British zone of occupation, and in late July 1945 Red Army forces moved out of East Styria (including the capital, Graz) and British troops moved into the territory the European Advisory Commission had assigned them (Styria and Carinthia). The final agreement for this zonal realignment came at the Potsdam Conference in late July, after Winston Churchill's protest and Iosif Stalin's procrastination (p. 391).

The bulk of the documents in this volume deal with the operational issues of half a dozen "border regiments" of the Soviet People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD) that operated behind the lines of the 3rd Ukrainian Army when it liberated this region. Most of these reports are summaries of NKVD counterintelligence activities in Styria from April to July 1945 and adumbrate the deep Soviet paranoia about a recurring Nazi threat when the war was over. The NKVD's principal worries were stay-behind Nazi terror operatives (Volkssturm, Werwolf, and "Gestapo agents") trained in Hungary and eastern Austria to terrorize the Red Army ("*Terroristen und Diversanten*")—a typical summary of such "German spies" appears on pp. 374–377. Moreover, the occupation authorities apprehended thousands of German and Austrian officers and soldiers who had switched from their uniforms into civilian clothes in order to reach the Western occupation zones ahead of the Red Army. The NKVD troops were also on the lookout for "Soviet citizens," including the tens of thousands of Russian and Ukrainian civilian laborers who had been snatched away and forced to work in Nazi war plants (Graz and East Styria are highly industrialized), as well as tens of thousands of Soviet prisoners of war (POWs) who had been brought to the Styrian iron and steel plants to work as slave laborers, and Red Army stragglers and deserters.

The NKVD counted every nose: members of the Red Army, among them 11,650 POWs in German hands; Allied soldiers in German hands (among them 3,002 POWs); civilian slave laborers rounded up in the area (72,469 Soviet citizens

and 24,002 citizens from other countries); and some 13,000 German officers and soldiers (pp. 311f). In addition, “tens of thousands” of German settlers expelled from the Gotschee region of Slovenia are mentioned (p. 357) and 300,000 Germans and Austrians expelled from Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia (p. 390). In the most chaotic weeks after the collapse of the Third Reich, the NKVD statisticians collected and pedantically recorded this sad mass of dislocated humanity but showed no sympathy for the countless individual tragedies.

The NKVD also painstakingly documented the tragic story of the handover of the “Vlasovites” from British to Soviet forces in Judenburg. This special group who “betrayed their fatherland” comprised 42,258 troops and family members (2,972 women and 1,445 children) of General Andrei Vlasov’s army who had fought against Soviet forces and ended up in the British zone of Austria. The British handed them all over to the Red Army (pp. 359–361). Many subsequently perished in the Siberian gulag. The detailed, matter-of-fact bookkeeping about the cold-blooded handover, the imprisonment in camps in Styria, and the eventual transport to Romania is astounding and includes mention of suicides and occasional escape attempts.

The NKVD also recorded numerous cases of rape and pillage by Red Army forces in Styria, but frequently implied that blame lay with German troops in Red Army uniforms. The NKVD clearly lowballed the cases of rape and “amoral behavior” (the euphemism is “amoralische Entgleisungen,” p. 315) and was less concerned with such ghastly behavior than with the hundreds of cases of Red Army soldiers poisoned by captured booze. On 12 May, 75 soldiers died from alcohol poisoning, and 251 others were reported drunk (p. 222). The introduction notes that in East Styria 9,463 rapes were recorded by police stations but that the numbers surely were much higher (p. 26). A dozen documents at the end of the volume record the massive Soviet industrial removals from Styria from May through July 1945, all of which were later given the date of 28 July (pp. 392–411). Stalin was in no hurry to move out of Styria as long as the loot was good. The NKVD also carefully observed the rebuilding of the Graz and Styrian governments and regional administration and the lack of a Communist presence. No history of Soviet raping and looting and state-organized industrial removals from Central Europe will be complete without these valuable documents.

This is a carefully edited volume with an excellent scholarly introduction that adds considerably to our knowledge of Red Army operations at the end of World War II in Central Europe. The book fills an important void in completing the picture of the early occupation of Austria. The one drawback is that the documents are repetitive: daily, weekly, and monthly regimental situation reports cover the same material ad nauseam. Some documents have dozens of footnotes about place names and the scholarly literature of the region, which is excessively repeated in the notes to each document. What is missing are good maps of the area giving the reader a clear picture of the advances of the Red Army into Central Europe. Still, this is a documentary volume that every respectable research library will have to include among its holdings. The editors are to be commended for completing the picture of Red Army operations in Austria and for making these documents, many of them obscure, so handily available to scholars who do not read Russian.



Kathryn C. Statler, *Replacing France: The Origins of American Intervention in Vietnam*. Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 2007. 378 pp.

Reviewed by A. J. Langguth, University of Southern California

Now that scholars too young to remember the Vietnam War are writing revisionist tracts on the conflict, Kathryn Statler's thoughtful contribution to the discussion is particularly welcome. She has taken as her subject the underexamined transition from France's effort to reestablish its Vietnam colony to the time when the United States assumed the burden of keeping South Vietnam free from Communism. Her study centers on three major events: (1) the Geneva Conference of 1954, which divided Vietnam into North and South, with the promise of elections to unify the country two years later; (2) the installation of Ngo Dinh Diem to lead South Vietnam; and (3) the decision in 1956 to forgo the promised elections and instead wage a campaign to prevent Diem's South Vietnam from joining with Ho Chi Minh's regime in the North.

To each of those topics, Statler brings an impressive command of documentation and a patent desire to be fair to the historical record. In the process, she demonstrates how the Eisenhower administration forced the French to give up any surviving influence in the North and instead to join in Washington's crusade on Diem's behalf. One can agree that this was an early missed opportunity in Vietnam, even without fully accepting Statler's conclusion that a French presence in the North might have "helped create conditions for a much earlier reunification" (p. 236) than the one finally imposed by the collapse of the South Vietnamese army in 1975.

Because this is a diplomatic not a military history, a major turning point like the Battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954 figures only for its effect on the political maneuvering in Washington. Eisenhower's secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, became worried that the French defeat would leave a vacuum in Asia that the Soviet Union would fill. Statler's outlining of the debate over what America should do to relieve the French soldiers under siege at their outpost west of Hanoi is absorbing even at this late date.

The reader may be surprised to learn that it was Senator William Knowland of California, a prominent member of the China lobby, who advised Dulles that the U.S. Senate would not authorize intervention unless the French guaranteed immediate independence for Indochina (p. 92). Because that would have negated France's entire nine-year effort in the region, the French refused.

One of the book's most valuable contributions is a painstaking dissection of the failure in 1956 to hold the promised election to unify the country. Received wisdom has held that the United States pressed a compliant Diem to avoid the vote because Ho Chi Minh would be the sure winner. Some have suggested that North Vietnam was less outraged than its propaganda might indicate because, with Northern farmers protesting the botched agrarian reform, the North Vietnamese Politburo was not eager at that moment to absorb the fractious South.

In separate sections dealing with each world capital, Statler points out that Wash-

ington was torn between affirming traditional American support for free elections and fear of their outcome. Dulles used the example of East and West Germany, where elections had been discussed fruitlessly for ten years, to urge Diem simply to agree to elections in principle. Meantime, the French were pushing for a vote, worried that if it was not held, Ho's forces might resume fighting and trap the sizable number of French troops still in Vietnam. But as Ho discovered to his dismay, neither Moscow nor Beijing wanted to risk confrontation with the United States over a comparatively minor issue (p. 170).

In the end, Washington learned, not for the last time, that its anointed leaders in the South had their own agendas. Despite U.S. pressure, Diem ignored the July 1955 deadline for consulting with the North on election procedures. Statler writes: "The Eisenhower administration considered using the threat of cutting American aid in order to force Diem to consider consultations, but in the end chose not to" (p. 161).

Particularly enlightening is Statler's investigation of the issue from Hanoi's viewpoint. Denied forceful support from Communist allies, the North believed that other signatories at Geneva would force Diem to hold the elections. But Hanoi's Politburo, like the West, underestimated Diem's determination and his ability to hold on. Politburo members believed that Diem's regime would "fall like ripe fruit"—if not during general elections, then from internal subversion (p. 175).

As we know, Diem's maneuvering bought him seven more years of power in South Vietnam before he and his brother paid for those years with their lives. Statler persuasively shows how the United States, by replacing France in Vietnam during the decade from 1950 to 1960, made inevitable the disaster that was to come. In her conclusion, Statler spells out for leaders in contemporary Washington the danger in jostling aside America's allies in favor of going it alone.



Duccio Basosi, *Il governo del dollaro: Interdipendenza economica e potere statunitense negli anni di Richard Nixon (1969–1973)*. Florence, Italy: Edizioni Polistampa, 2006. 250 pp. €16.00.

Reviewed by Leopoldo Nuti, Università Roma Tre (Italy)

Recent years have brought a revival of scholarly interest in the foreign policy of Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger. The renewed interest has been stimulated by the opening of a number of relevant sources, allowing historians to probe old theses and advance new interpretations. Because U.S. foreign policy decisions in the early 1970s shook the whole international system, a thorough understanding of these decisions illuminates the broader history of the Cold War.

Duccio Basosi's *Il governo del dollaro* is a most welcome addition to this wealth of new works. A recent Ph.D. scholar from the University of Florence, Basosi moves at ease in the relatively unexplored field of the history of international monetary policy and the international economy, developing for the Nixon years the kind of approach

that has been adopted by such scholars as Francis Gavin and Hubert Zimmermann for the study of the 1960s. The remarkable nature of this book was acknowledged in 2007 when Basosi was awarded the Italian Society of Contemporary History's prize for the best first book by a young author.

Basosi's goal is straightforward; namely, to analyze the crucial economic policy decisions adopted by the Nixon administration in August 1971 and to set them in their proper historical context. The Nixon administration not only ended the dollar's convertibility into gold but also took a number of other steps that permanently undermined the Bretton Woods international monetary system.

The abandonment of Bretton Woods, Basosi notes, is often seen as a turning point in the evolution of the international system, but he believes that explanations of the decision have been contradictory and theoretically deficient. If Nixon was forced to act the way he did, how can he be held responsible for such a choice? If his decisions were the symptom of an inevitable U.S. decline in the world economy, how does one explain that the United States emerged from the crisis stronger than before and in a leadership position that was increasingly unassailable?

Basosi has rigorously analyzed a large number of sources at the U.S. National Archives, the Federal Records Centers, and the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, where he often was the first to explore the papers of such crucial figures for Nixon's economic policy as David Kennedy, John Connally, George Shultz, Paul Volcker, and Arthur Burns. This research enabled him to develop a coherent interpretation that demonstrates how the 1971 decisions were the result of a long, complex, and meticulous foreign policy analysis that must be evaluated together with the other momentous decisions of the Nixon administration.

Faced with a deteriorating economic situation that seriously hampered the flexibility of U.S. foreign policy, Nixon was aware from the earliest days of his administration of the need to revise the Bretton Woods system. But, according to Basosi, this urge was combined with other pressures from a U.S. economic establishment, which hoped to inject a new dose of liberalism into a capitalist system that was enjoying the final benefits from the long cycle of Keynesian expansion launched in the early post-war years. Although Nixon was inclined to pay attention to the calls for a new wave of unbridled capitalist growth, he was also aware of the need to reconcile these aspirations with the economic and political exigencies of the West Europeans. This increasingly tense relationship with the European allies led directly to the decisions of August 1971. If no multilateral agreement on reform of the Bretton Woods system could be achieved with the European allies, then the United States would not only act unilaterally but would do so in a way most effective for the restoration of U.S. economic primacy. Basosi follows the evolution of this debate in different U.S. government channels and demonstrates its close relationship with the parallel efforts by the West European countries to improve their own economic position vis-à-vis the United States. Eventually, the growing awareness that no U.S.-European concerted effort to reform Bretton Woods was in sight gave greater leverage to those inside the administration who were warning the president that he must drastically change the rules of

the game of the international economy—and in a way that would turn out to be most beneficial to the United States.

In the concluding chapter, Basosi asks whether Nixon's decisions should be classed as the founding moment of the recent wave of economic globalization based on deregulated capitalism. Basosi prudently refrains from affirming such a momentous conclusion, but he seems to find at least a certain causal connection between the decisions of August 1971 and the rise of globalization. Aside from these highly speculative conclusions, however, what is remarkable about this lucid, terse, well-argued, and well-written book is the sure-footedness with which Basosi masters such a complex argument and demonstrates his thesis by moving through an amazing web of economic and monetary details without losing sight of his broader interpretive framework. The 1971 economic decisions come out of this narrative as another central step in the reformation of American foreign policy carried out by the Nixon administration. According to Basosi, they should be ranked alongside Nixon's other paramount decisions, such as the opening to China, as one of the foundations of a new cycle of U.S. foreign relations.



Michael Bernhard, *Institutions and the Fate of Democracy*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005. 310 pp.

Reviewed by Anna Grzymala-Busse, University of Michigan

Michael Bernhard's book sets out to answer two critical questions: Why do new democracies choose particular institutions? And how does institutional choice influence democratic survival?

Bernhard posits that a variety of interests inform decision-makers' preferences over institutions: concern for their political parties, for democracy, and for their own power. This institution-framing coalition (the group of leaders in charge of choosing the initial institutional framework) needs to be broad so that the institutions it finds can prove durable. Its members interact in several ways that constitute institutional choice: consensus, imposition, or compromise (splitting differences and trading support across issues). Democracies then survive or fail depending on how the resulting institutional choices interact with the broader economic and social environment. When the founders choose institutions that are ill suited to this context, defective institutional choice results, as in Weimar Germany. When *no* democratic set of institutions can provide a satisfactory solution to a society's conflicts, democratization is doomed. Bernhard argues that poor democratic institutional performance is the result of a conflict between the logic of institutional choice, which centers on fulfilling the founders' preferences, and the logic of democratic functioning, which centers on preventing any one set of actors from automatically gaining the upper hand. Effective democratic institutions thus create "compromises between political forces that maintain broad political support for the system" (p. 19).

The argument is supported with evidence from four cases: Weimar and post-1945 Germany and interwar and post-Communist Poland. Each case study discusses executive, legislative, and electoral institutions, as well as “other institutional features that played an important role in the overall process of choice” (p. 22). Bernhard also carefully documents the complexities of the social, political, and economic context in which decision-makers chose and established these institutions. He emphasizes the importance of contextual variables, including societal cleavages, ethnic fragmentation, economic vulnerability, legacies of the authoritarian past, charismatic leaders, the distribution of political ideologies represented by parties, and levels of economic development and modernity. These contextual factors meant that “whether a set of institutions proves effective in channeling conflict in a given society is determined by how those institutions interact with the broader set of domestic and international economic, social, and political conditions present after democratic transition” (p. 263). The core claim, then, is that the process of institutional choice interacts with a variety of context-specific social, economic, and political variables to affect how democratic institutions function.

The result is a rich, nuanced study of the processes of institutional choice in four distinct settings. The book examines not only the decisive actors and their strategies but the dynamics of the processes of institutional creation. Bernhard shies away from facile generalizations or universal claims, and provokes several broader insights.

First, the scholarly consensus is that successful institutional design is premised on institutions that create their own coalitions and broaden their support. Bernhard’s contribution to this literature is a more sophisticated claim about the initial need for a stable coalition in order to generate longer-term institutionalization. The rapid entrance of excluded societal representatives and leaders can backfire. For example, in the failed (and short-lived) case of interwar Polish democracy, the initial set of representative institutions could not absorb the participation of the newly enlarged Polish electorate. With the enfranchisement of minorities, 20 percent of Sejm seats were now held by minorities, up from the 3–4 percent they held in the Constituent Sejm. The result was a fragmented parliament incapable of producing stable and effective governments, and no new coalitions coalesced around democratic institutions. In other words, temporality matters: Successful democratic institutions need broad supporting coalitions at the outset rather than attempting to broaden such coalitions subsequently.

Second, although Bernhard argues that a variety of contextual variables influenced the success of democratic institution-building, the clearest difference between the failed interwar democracies and the successes of postwar German and post-Communist Poland seems to be the changed international context. In Bernhard’s account, the Allies supervised (albeit in very different ways) the complex creation of postwar German federal and electoral structures. Similarly, a bevy of international advisers, financial institutions, and the European Union all played a role in building Polish democracy after 1989. The interwar context was very different, with international actors assuming stances that ranged from indifference to outright hostility. Such an emphasis on the international incentives and constraints may run counter to the sub-

tlety and complexity of Bernhard's analysis, but it is one way to counter the potential criticism that the causal account is overdetermined, inasmuch as the successful democratic cases enjoyed "better" institutional choices (ones that struck a balance between representation and stability) and "better" political and economic domestic environments and "better" international contexts. If context matters, we want to know which contextual variables are critical—and international factors stand out.

A third central insight from Bernhard's analysis is the multiplicity of mechanisms by which institutions arise: compromises, impositions, and consensus. Here, Bernhard argues that imposition is the least likely to lead to durable democratic institutions, a failure that was evident in interwar Poland. Yet it is unclear that compromise or consensus (either over issues or by splitting the differences) leads to better outcomes: For example, the equally unsuccessful Weimar institution builders compromised on centralization, the role of religion, Prussia, and presidential power, and they agreed on electoral rules. (Interwar Polish decision-makers compromised on the electoral system and on the legislature, two out of the three critical institutional domains.) These patterns beg the question of whether these mechanisms matter for democratic durability or whether they simply link variables to outcomes without a causal role.

Institutions and the Fate of Democracy raises these questions and answers many others. It is a cogent, nuanced contribution to the study of democratization, institutional choice, and regime durability.



Gerd-Rainer Horn, *The Spirit of '68: Rebellion in Western Europe and North America, 1956–1976*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. 254 pp.

Reviewed by Gottfried Niedhart, University of Mannheim (Germany)

The relatively stable world of the 1950s, with its postwar reconstruction and the clear-cut confrontation of the Cold War, underwent a period of transition during the 1960s when the expectations of the "affluent society" (Kenneth Galbraith) proved to be overly optimistic, when societal hierarchies still stemming from the prewar world were questioned, and when the dangers of the Cold War impasse became apparent. Broadly speaking, responses to these challenges took one of two forms. Each was supposed to create change, albeit to a much different degree from the other. The reformers wanted to adapt the existing order to the new circumstances of the 1960s and to civilize the East-West conflict by pursuing a policy of *détente*. This did not satisfy the more radical protesters who followed the slogan, "Run forward Comrade, the old world is behind you." Horn's book is about the latter position. He does not aim only at its description and at a narrative "of what happened and how it happened" (p. 231). His goal is also to depict the more radical position as a promising answer to the "transnational moment of crisis and opportunity" (p. 4) that had emerged in many parts of the world. Altogether 56 countries were affected by the "Spirit of '68," among them the United States and Canada, 14 countries in Latin America, 22 in Europe, 10 in Asia,

and 8 in Africa. In a way that is certainly risky for any professional historian, Horn identifies himself with the “68ers” and wants to “rescue these experiments in ‘participatory democracy’ and the corresponding social struggles from historical distortion and condescension to which much recent historiography appears to condemn the promising era of revolt” (pp. 1–2).

Driven by this impetus Horn has written a lively account of what he calls “the spirit of ’68.” In accordance with recent research the calendar year 1968 appears in a wide context. Horn starts in the 1950s when nonconformists prepared the terrain. He differentiates between an “intellectually vibrant preparatory period” (p. 229) from 1956 to 1966 and the main period of the “spirit,” which lasted until 1976. Horn traces the “spirit” in North America, Scandinavia, and Western and Mediterranean Europe, thereby tackling his topic in a comparative and transnational approach. What makes the book a special read is Horn’s extensive treatment of worker protest in various countries, a subject that is usually missing from the literature of the 1960s. Horn is well known as a specialist on the history of socialism and the working classes in Europe, so this approach does not come as a surprise. However, I am not convinced that the struggle for wages and better working conditions was, with the exception of Italy (and there only for a short period), really part of the “sociocultural paradigm shift” (p. 231) of the 1960s. Horn provides the reader with a thorough study of events in the United States and gives much attention to Belgium and Italy and, to a lesser degree, to France and the Iberian Peninsula. He looks closely at the Dutch Provos who turned Amsterdam into a pilgrimage site for many American and European rebels. West German and French students’ activities are “consciously not a focus” (p. 3). Horn selects “countries, locations, movements and cultural trends” that, in his view, are a “representative sample” (p. 3). But he fails to give any criteria for his selection. What is really deplorable is that Eastern Europe is totally ignored even though the cracks in the Soviet empire and within the Warsaw Pact states should be seen as an important element of the “spirit” that is under review in this book.

Horn bemoans the failure of “1968.” But one can argue that with respect to the effects of, for example, the Prague Spring and, as a consequence of the Final Act of Helsinki in 1975, of the *Charta 77*, an international as well as transnational “spirit” transformed the East-West conflict and finally brought down the autocratic regimes in Eastern Europe. On the other hand, dissidents in the East mostly strove for liberal democracy and a market economy, something that was under attack in the Western world. In other words, the mood of change was aiming for more than Horn allows. Apart from repeating Arthur Marwick’s thesis that the 1960s can best be understood as a “cultural revolution” (pp. 191–192), Horn fails to define the “spirit of ’68.” In particular, he refuses to deal with the societal forces that, not from a revolutionary but from a reformist position, were part of the process of change that shaped the decade and that succeeded in attracting many or perhaps most “advocates of system-transforming radical changes” (p. 234) to the path of gradual reform.



Phillip T. Rutherford, *Prelude to the Final Solution. The Nazi Program for Deporting Ethnic Poles, 1939–1941*. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2007. 328 pp. \$34.95.

Reviewed by Antony Polonsky, Brandeis University

The national conflict in the Polish-German borderlands emerged in its modern form during the revolution of 1848. The conflict intensified after the unification of Germany when, first under Bismarck and then, in a more intensified form, under his successors after 1890, attempts were made to Germanize the areas of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth that had been incorporated into Prussia following the partitions. An *Ostmarkverein* (Association for the Eastern Provinces) was set up to purchase (and later expropriate) Polish land and settle it with German colonists. During the First World War, after the occupation of much of the Russian partition of Poland, German planners even mooted the establishment of a broad strip between the areas they had controlled before the outbreak of war and the small satellite Polish kingdom they set up in November 1916, from which Poles and Jews would be expelled and which would then be settled by German colonists.

All these schemes were brought to naught by the German defeat and the establishment of an independent Polish state that incorporated broad areas of Prussia, including the port of Danzig. Large numbers of ethnic Germans were unwilling to live under Polish rule and left the territory. The settlement of the disputed frontier, particularly in Upper Silesia, was accompanied by the creation of German and Polish paramilitary groups and considerable violence. The call for the revision of the Polish-German frontier was almost universal among the politicians of the Weimar Republic, the only difference being between those like Gustav Stresemann, chancellor from 1925 to 1929, who hoped that this could be achieved peacefully with the support of the Western powers, and those who believed force was required.

Adolf Hitler broke with the anti-Polish traditions of Weimar. In spite of the centrality of schemes for the “colonization” of land in the east in his thinking and particularly in *Mein Kampf*, he saw the pragmatic advantages in reaching an understanding with Poland, concluding a non-aggression agreement with the Polish government on 26 January 1934. His goals were purely tactical. In this way, he was able to drive a wedge between France and its principal ally in the east and pursue without danger his policy of rearmament. After the death of the charismatic Polish dictator, Józef Piłsudski, in May 1935, Polish-German ties became still closer as Józef Beck, the Polish foreign minister, used the freedom of maneuver that these gave him to force Lithuania to establish diplomatic relations with Poland in March 1938 and to acquire after the Munich agreement a part of former Austrian Silesia from Czechoslovakia. Hitler’s goal was probably to recruit the Poles to participate in his plans for the conquest of the Soviet Union. However, when after Munich he put pressure on Poland in order to force it into an alliance that would make the country a de facto German dependency and would thus free him to move either east or west, Beck refused. The Poles sought a British guarantee of their independence, while Hitler was able to outbid the West and

reach an accommodation with the Soviet Union for the partition of Eastern Europe. This led to the partition of Poland between Germany and the Soviet Union and the defeat of Poland at German hands in September–October 1939.

The Poles by this point had become a major obstacle to Hitler's plans for a great German empire in the east, and he was prepared to use the most drastic means to crush and eliminate them. Indeed he saw his rule in Poland as a prototype for the "colonial" regime of German masters ruling over Slav helots that he intended to establish in the areas he hoped to conquer in the east. The occupied territory was divided into two parts. One area, comprising former Prussian Poland, the Dąbrowa basin, and the areas around Łódź and Suwałki, was directly incorporated into the Reich. The rest of Poland assigned to Germany per terms of the Soviet-German friendship treaty of September 1939 was maintained as a separate entity to which the name "*Generalgouvernement*," redolent of World War I, was given. Under pressure from Iosif Stalin, Hitler decided not to establish a rump Polish government here, and the area was subjected to ruthless economic exploitation and used as a labor reserve. It was slated for Germanization after the final German victory.

The areas openly annexed by the Reich were formed into two new administrative units, Reichsgau Danzig and Reichsgau Wartheland, which was made up of the former Grand Duchy of Posen with some areas from the western part of the Kingdom of Poland, including the textile town of Łódź, now renamed Litzmanstadt after a First World War general. Polish Upper Silesia was united with the German province and the area around Suwałki was incorporated into East Prussia. The policies pursued here, like so much of what was done by the Nazis, were a grotesquely exaggerated version of proposals made before and during World War I for the administration of Prussian Poland and for the creation of a border strip. Thus, the annexed territory, with its population of 8.9 million Poles, 603,000 Jews and only 600,000 Germans, was marked out for a policy of ruthless Germanization, personally supervised by the head of the SS, Heinrich Himmler. The overwhelming majority of the Poles were seen as irreconcilable enemies whose ultimate fate was to be either expulsion to the *Generalgouvernement* or physical extermination. They were to be supplanted by German settlers from the Baltic states, the Soviet Union, and elsewhere. Thus, from September 1939 the goal of Nazi policy was to expel all Jews and most Poles from the German-annexed lands of western Poland into the *Generalgouvernement* in order to make room for the German settlers from southeastern and eastern Europe, including those from the Baltic states.

The nature of the German administration in the Warthegau region in the period between the Polish defeat and the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 is the subject of Philip Rutherford's important monograph, a reworked version of a doctoral dissertation submitted at Pennsylvania State University. As he shows, because of the improved relations between Germany and Poland from 1934 to late 1938, little forward planning had been undertaken, and the administration initially had to improvise. The expulsion of the Poles was thus not only a reworking of earlier plans and a response to Polish atrocities against alleged German fifth columnists (which were on a much smaller scale than German atrocities committed by the Wehrmacht and the

SS against Poles) but also a response to the need to provide for *Volksdeutsche* allowed to leave the areas incorporated into the Soviet Union in 1939 and 1940 (Volynia, Bessarabia, and Northern Bukovina, the Baltic states). In Rutherford's words, "the actual program for resettlement and expulsion was, in a very real sense, thrown together at the last minute" (p. 62). The book is above all an institutional history examining the administration of the fanatical *Reichsgovernor* of Reichsgau Wartheland, Arthur Greiser, and his subordinates Wilhelm Koppe, a *Höhere SS und Polizeiführer* (Higher SS and Police Leader) in the Wartheland, and Albert Rapp, who organized the expulsions Greiser appointed. Rapp set up a "Staff for Evacuation" (*Evakuierungsstab*), recruited from the ranks of the Security Police reorganized in Posen (Poznań) in April 1940 as the *Umwandererzentralstelle* (UWZ; Central Office for Migrants) under the control of the Reinhard Heydrich's *Sicherheitspolizei* and Heinrich Himmler's *Reichskommissariat für die Festigung des deutschen Volkstums*. These were the individuals and institutions responsible for organizing the resettlement of *Volksdeutsche* and the expulsion of Poles and Jews.

The deportations took place in four waves. Under the "First Interim Plan" (*1. Nahplan*), which was implemented from 1 to 16 December, roughly 88,000 people were transported to the *Generalgouvernement*, mainly to the Lublin Province, often in unheated freight cars and to areas where no provision had been made to absorb them. They included around 10,000 Jews, mainly from Łódź. The harshness of this action aroused some opposition from the Wehrmacht, and the military commander in the Wartheland, General Petzel, was obliged to issue a subsequent order on 3 February 1940 specifically forbidding members of the Wehrmacht to intervene on behalf of those expelled. The expulsion created chaos in the *Generalgouvernement*, which by 1 February 1940 had been compelled to take in nearly 611,000 individuals, including over 450,000 Jews from the western Polish territories annexed by the Reich and led to protests from the head of the German administration of these territories, Hans Frank.

In an analysis of the "First Interim Plan," the SS concluded that hasty implementation had led to the deportation of many people who should have been kept in the Warthegau. As a result, the deportation process was centralized and was, for the moment, concentrated on rural Poles who were to make place for ethnic Germans. This was in spite of Heydrich's call on 21 December for the expulsion of all Jews. Thus in the "Intermediate Plan" (*Zwischenplan*) around 40,000 people were expelled from the Warthegau of whom only several hundred were Jews. The "Second Interim Plan" (*2. Nahplan*), which began on 1 March 1940, saw the expulsion from the Warthegau of 133,508 persons, most of whom were Polish farmers who were resettled into the *Generalgouvernement* east of the Vistula. Most of the remainder were sent to Germany as forced laborers; a small number were selected by the SS for Germanization. The deportation also included 2,663 Jews who were deported from Posen (Poznań) in April 1940 to the *Generalgouvernement*.

From September 1940 to March 1941 a new wave of *Volksdeutsche*—approximately 275,000 thousand individuals from Lithuania, Bessarabia, and Bukovina—were to be brought "home to the Reich." The goal of the "Third Interim Plan" (*3. Nahplan*) begun on February 5, 1941, was to make place for some of them. Ini-

tially it made provision for the expulsion from the Warthegau of 81,000 people. The plan was halted on 15 March 1941, because of the need to give priority to the logistical demands of the impending invasion of the Soviet Union. By that date, a total of 19,226 persons had been deported, including 2,140 Jews. The resettlement of *Volksdeutsche* continued until the end of 1942, by which time an additional 82,093 persons had been resettled inside the Warthegau. This was often accomplished by the seizure of Polish homesteads even if their inhabitants were not expelled from the area. In all, a total of 130,826 inhabitants of the Warthegau lost their homes in the years 1941 and 1942. Many of these were conscripted for forced labor in the Reich.

Deportations were resumed after the invasion of the Soviet Union commenced, but on a smaller scale because of the exigencies of the war. By the end of 1944 more than 750,000 German colonists had been resettled in the area, 330,000 Poles had been murdered, and an additional 860,000 Poles had been expelled either to the *Generalgouvernement* or to forced labor in Germany.

Rutherford concentrates on the mechanics of the deportation and on the nature of the machinery that carried it out. The book is based primarily on German archival sources and secondary material. Rutherford makes much less use of Polish material and offers little discussion of the impact of the brutal policies of deportation on those affected by them. This gap is partly compensated for by the many contemporary photographs, which give a vivid picture of the inhumanity of Germany policy. However, as Klaus-Peter Friedrich has pointed out (in a review posted on the website of the American Association for Polish-Jewish Studies, <http://aapjs.org>), there are problems with the attribution of some of these photographs. He notes that “on p. 145 the photograph is supposedly taken “near Litzmannstadt” (Łódź). But since a uniformed Polish police officer in dark blue is visible here, this can only be a photo from the GG. According to the author, the photo on p. 152 above shows ‘a group of dejected new arrivals at the UWZ camps’ in the Warthegau. But a book on German occupation crimes in the area of Zamość has the same photo, trimmed at the edges, with the caption: The resettled population is waiting for ‘racial’ examination. The attribution of the photographs on pages 95, 146, 152 (lower) and 153 appears questionable, because it is difficult to establish here whether the persons shown are deported Poles or Jews, in-migrating Germans living outside the Reich (*Auslandsdeutsche*), resettled *Volksdeutsche* or others.”

The book’s title, *Prelude to the Final Solution*, stresses the links between the treatment of the Poles in the Warthegau in the first 21 months of the war with the adoption of a policy of mass murder of Jews in Nazi-controlled Europe probably in the fall of 1941. Policy toward the Jews was certainly part of the radical ethnic restructuring of Eastern Europe that began in September 1939, and the expertise acquired in the deportations from the Warthegau was deployed in the annihilation of the Jews. However, what is striking about the policy of the Germanization of the formerly Polish western territories is that it was largely brought to an end because of other economic and strategic imperatives. Perhaps the policy would have been resumed after the final German victory, but what is salient here is the contrast with the way Hitler handled the Jews. To achieve a “Final Solution to the Jewish Question,” he subordinated ratio-

nal considerations to the ideological imperatives of destroying the “implacable racial enemy” of the Third Reich. Although the Nazis’ treatment of the Jews was subject to what Hans Mommsen has called a “cumulative process of radicalization,” the policy on Poles was subject to other considerations. In Rutherford’s words, “Nazi Volkstumspolitik vis-à-vis the Poles in question de-radicalized *in practice* from a policy of deportation to one of displacement, combined with the widespread Germanization of hundreds of thousands of otherwise ‘racially inferior’ Poles” (p. 220). In this sense, the “war against the Jews” was central to Hitler’s view of the world in a way that the “war against the Poles” was not.



László Borhi, *Hungary in the Cold War, 1945–1956: Between the United States and the Soviet Union*. Budapest: Central European University Press, 2004. 352 pp. \$49.95.

Reviewed by Anna Balogh, Independent Scholar

Hungary in the Cold War, 1945–1956 is a dense, well-researched book exploring Hungary’s role in the Cold War. László Borhi’s thought-provoking study gives some historical context but is primarily intended to provide new historical research and details for an audience already knowledgeable about Hungarian history.

The book is well structured. Chapter One (“We Do Not Wish to Move a Finger”) sets the stage for Borhi’s discussion of Hungary’s Cold War fate, which was sealed by interactions between Hungary and the Allies and among the Allies themselves during World War II. The title of the chapter comes from British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden’s memorable remark summarizing the Western position: “We do not wish to move a finger’ for the Hungarians” (p. 32). The chapters that follow describe Hungary’s dismal postwar situation and ripe conditions for exploitation, detailing how the Soviet Union and the Hungarian Communists steadily infiltrated positions of authority. Borhi also discusses the official Communist takeover in the election of 1947 in which an estimated 466,000 people were disenfranchised. More than 50,000 fraudulent votes were cast for the Hungarian Communists. To guarantee the Communists’ victory, the Soviet Union did not release Hungarian prisoners of war (POWs) until after the election. Once Soviet officials took control in 1945, they used economic expansion as a tool of domination in Hungary and Eastern Europe. The book’s accounts of Soviet economic rule and of Hungary as a client state are a notable contribution, particularly because most academic studies on the topic approach it from either the political or the military perspective. The book concludes with a description of U.S. policy toward Hungary and other satellite states from the end of World War II through the Hungarian revolution of 1956.

Hungary’s only significance to the Americans and British during the war was to distract the Germans from the D-Day landings in Normandy. Hungarian leader Miklós Horthy sought and signed a preliminary armistice with the Allies in the (vain) hope that U.S. and British forces would occupy Hungary before the Germans in-

vaded. He knew that a German presence would seal Hungary's fate because it would provoke a Soviet invasion in response, and then Soviet occupation and domination. An Anglo-American occupation was not as far-fetched as it sounds in retrospect. Churchill in fact repeatedly considered bringing Allied troops up the boot of Italy and heading east to Hungary, but eventually was convinced by the Americans to reach only as far east as Austria. Horthy asked that the negotiated armistice be kept secret, but the terms of the armistice were leaked to *The Times* of London by U.S. representatives in Hungary who evidently believed that Horthy's fear of the Soviet Union was irrational and obsessive.

Hungary was the site of heavy fighting toward the end of the war. The Soviet Union sustained 80,000 deaths and 240,000 wounded in the siege of Budapest alone. Hungary lost 340,000–360,000 soldiers, 80,000–100,000 non-Jewish civilians, and as many as 490,000 Jews. Roughly 600,000 Hungarians were taken to the USSR as prisoners of war, and as many as 200,000 did not return. In short, Hungary lost 10 percent of its population. In addition, some 50,000–200,000 Hungarian women were raped by Soviet troops. Moreover, 40 percent of Hungary's national wealth was destroyed, including damage to 90 percent of industrial plants and 40 percent of the rail network.

Hungary also lost most of its pro-Western political elites, who either were persecuted by the Germans or became refugees fleeing the Soviet occupation. Hungary no longer had the political elites to withstand pressure from the Soviet Union and Hungarian Communists who seized positions of authority in order to tighten the noose at a later date.

After the war, the United States, Great Britain, and the USSR set up the Allied Control Commission (ACC) to oversee Hungary and administer reparations. The Soviet authorities used the ACC to gain control via exploitation, ignoring U.S. and British complaints. In this way, the Soviet Union became the sole arbiter of Hungarian politics. Observers such as the U.S. representative in Hungary mistakenly believed that Hungarian political parties made political compromises of their own accord.

The book details American naïveté in dealing with the Soviet Union mostly by quoting from U.S. politicians and diplomats but also includes a memorable photograph of President Harry Truman sharing a laugh with the future Hungarian Communist dictator Mátyás Rákosi on the steps of the White House taken during Hungarian Prime Minister Ferenc Nagy's 1946 visit. Borhi also quotes American minister to Hungary Arthur Schoenfeld: "[Rákosi was] forceful and highly intelligent with the advantage of knowing his own mind. His knowledge of English and contact with Anglo-American press circles make him one of the more enlightened Hungarian public men" (p. 67). This statement betrays a reflexive bias against the Hungarians.

One of the book's main contributions is its discussion of the Soviet Union's use of economic expansion as a tool for the domination of Eastern Europe. Indeed, Soviet expansionist policies are most obvious in the economic realm. "Through the act of omission, then, historians perhaps unintentionally lend credence to the Marxist view that economic imperialism is the vice of capitalist powers only" (p. 139). The Soviet Union extracted \$23.2 billion from the Eastern European countries in the 1945–1960

period, far exceeding the amount the United States extended to Western Europe via the Marshall Plan. This figure does not include the costs of maintaining and hosting Soviet military forces.

From Hungary the Soviet Union took machinery, foodstuffs, finished goods, and strategic and non-strategic raw materials and enjoyed a continuous flow of monetary payments. Joint companies were established giving the USSR control of key parts of the economy, and Hungarian foreign trade was reoriented to the Soviet market. The United States tried to create an economically open sphere but was stopped by Soviet demands for a closed economic sphere. The Soviet Union confiscated companies in Hungary, eliminated Western investment, and gained de facto control of the war reparations system.

Economics became an excellent tool to delink Hungary's Western orientation. This strategy eliminated any possibility for a U.S. presence and guaranteed a stream of wealth to the USSR. The Soviet Union was able to tighten its hold over time inasmuch as economic profit from trade increased the economic power of the dominant country. Hungary as a client state became dependent on the dominant state, providing Moscow with further tools of coercion.

Borhi describes U.S. policy toward Hungary in 1956 as a "low-cost effort to destabilize the Soviet Union" (p. 306). If the effort failed, Americans could disclaim any involvement, leaving the Hungarian fighters to fend for themselves. Ultimately, 1956 was a definitive demonstration that the fate of Eastern Europe rested in the hands of the USSR alone.

Borhi strives to maintain a neutral even-handed tone, presents different views on events, and lets the quotations speak for themselves. The book is well researched and contains detailed accounts of how the Soviet Union came to dominate Hungary, both covertly and overtly. The structure of the book is excellent, although the editing needs considerable improvement. Minor grammatical errors might have been caught with better proofreading. However, none of this detracts from the great value of the book, which is worth reading for the insights it provides into this underresearched period in Hungary's history.



Wladimir Gelfand, *Deutschland-Tagebuch 1945–1946: Aufzeichnungen eines Rotarmisten*, trans. by Anja Lutter and Harmut Schröder, ed. by Elke Scherstjanoi. Berlin: Aufbau-Verlag, 2005. 357 pp.

Reviewed by Norman M. Naimark, Stanford University

The publication of the extensive, unexpurgated diary of a Red Army soldier who experienced both the end of the war on the Eastern Front and the Soviet occupation of Germany might well be considered an important development in the historiography of wartime and postwar Europe. Vladimir Gelfand's son brought his father's diary and papers to Germany when emigrating there in 1995. We have very few uncut and

uncensored diaries of Soviet soldiers from this period. Moreover, as a relatively unsophisticated and forthright writer, Gelfand does not seem to engage in much self-censorship. Nonetheless, the Gelfand diary unfortunately falls far short of expectations, despite the expert editing, annotation, and afterword by Elke Scherstjanoi, one of Germany's leading specialists on the Soviet occupation forces, and despite the excellent production of the book, which includes numerous evocative photographs of Gelfand in Germany. The interposing of Gelfand's letters home to his mother, father, other relatives, and friends is effective as a way to deepen one's understanding of the young lieutenant's views and experiences. The real problem with the book is Gelfand, who, as Scherstjanoi points out, "is interested above all in himself" (p. 333).

Not only is Gelfand completely self-absorbed, he is not a terribly interesting or perceptive 22-year-old. Like many aspiring members of the Soviet intelligentsia of his generation, he harbors exaggerated literary pretensions and ambitions. But he also has few skills other than his general literacy and familiarity with Soviet literature from the 1930s. His references to Russian literature of the nineteenth century or to the German classics are fleeting and superficial. He does write regularly and at length as a way, he believes, to develop his talent. He records in his diaries some scenarios for future stories, none of which are especially intriguing. He is proud of his poetry, particularly the following poem, which he inscribed on the Reichstag (it also appears in a letter to his mother and a diary entry of 24 August 1945). "On the balcony of a Berlin apartment house; I stand with the comrades; And look at and spit on Germany; I spit on Berlin, the conquered" (pp. 113, 126).

In the first part of the diary, from January 1945 to the immediate aftermath of victory in May, Gelfand spends an inordinate amount of time complaining about his comrades-in-arms. He describes their behavior as gross, simpleminded, larcenous, and thoroughly besotted (while at the same time professing his everlasting Soviet patriotism), and it is apparent that he gets along with very few of them. In fact, wherever he goes, he seems to arouse the animosity of his immediate superiors and those around him. He is a party member, a "Stalinist," and an aspiring political propagandist. But no one wants to hear about his political interventions. He is alternatively incensed and whiny about the fact that he is repeatedly passed over for military medals. He sees himself as cultivated and sensitive and his comrades as invariably brutish, conspiratorial, and envious. Only much later in his diary does he suggest that perhaps he was passed over for medals because of his Jewish background. In fact, he says almost nothing about his Jewishness or about the Holocaust. This is particularly notable because he does mention in a petition to his superiors for home leave that he lost many family members to Nazi mass murder.

Gelfand's ruminations on women and sex in occupied Germany dominate his thoughts and feelings. He thinks of himself as devastatingly attractive to women. He does not blame them for flirting with him on the streets, sleeping with him when he offers them the opportunity, and falling in love with him, as they do routinely. Although he says he prefers Russian women, he goes from German girlfriend to German girlfriend, naively disappointed that "true love" is elusive and that none of his par-amours live up to his elevated thoughts about the ideal woman. He shows almost no

recognition that hunger and the need for protection drive many of these German girls and women to his bed. Not surprisingly, he comes down with a case of venereal disease and has to endure the painful cure of turpentine injections. Typically, the only woman Gelfand seems genuinely to admire—the daughter of a Russian family deported to Germany by the Nazis—rebuffs his attempts to get close to her. Russian women, he concludes, do not appreciate a sensitive and gentle temperament like his own. Gelfand says almost nothing about the ubiquitous problem of rape in occupied Germany. He is completely uninterested in German politics or the problems of four-power Berlin. At the same time, he often denigrates German standards of culture and manners, making fun of the Germans' fetishes about food and their stinginess, all understandable in the postwar circumstances of shortages and acute hunger.

Before Gelfand was demobilized at the end of September 1946, he worked in various parts of the Soviet reparations and trophy administration in Germany, removing industrial material and libraries, transporting timber and spare parts. His observations of his tasks provide some insights into the chaos of the *démontage* operations and the desultory manner in which they were often carried out. The way he is able to move around the Soviet zone, more or less at will, and his constantly changing assignments in one or another town and city, reveal a much more free-floating life than is often assumed of Soviet soldiers in the occupation. He is incessantly buying, selling, and trading, looking in one town for film, in another for a camera, and in a third for tailored clothes. The frequency with which he sends packages and letters home reflect a flow of information and material from Germany to the Soviet Union that may well have had a larger impact on postwar Soviet existence than historians have understood. Despite Gelfand's repetitive stories of exploitative womanizing in Germany, they do suggest that sexual relations between occupation soldiers in the Soviet zone may have resembled those in the Western zones more than scholars originally thought. One gets a picture of loose morals and easy sex in the Soviet zone that fits the picture of postwar Germany as a whole and that, like Germany as a whole was based on the deprivation and insecurity endured by countless women and girls.

Although useful lessons can be gained from reading Gelfand's diary, many of the censored diaries and memoirs published in article and book form during the Soviet period were more insightful and engaging than this account. In fact, the publishers and editor would have done their readers a favor by cutting Gelfand's often repetitious diary. Three hundred pages of Vladimir Gelfand as young soldier is more than any reader can take, even a reader who is deeply interested in immediate postwar Germany.



Jonathan R. Zatlin, *The Currency of Socialism: Money and Political Culture in East Germany*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007. 377 pp.

Reviewed by Peter Loedel, West Chester University

A historical timetable of significant and transforming moments in German history would inevitably be punctuated with references to money, monetary policy, and currency politics. From the establishment of the German Reich in 1871 to the crisis of Weimar symbolized by the hyperinflation of 1923, and from the establishment of the West German Deutschmark (and solidification of the division of Germany) in 1948 to the monetary unification of Germany in July 1990, the politics of money permeates the fabric of Germany's political, economic, and cultural psyche. Jonathan Zatlin's impressive study of the economic and monetary "culture of socialist consumerism" (p. 15) in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) provides a critical and important link in our understanding of the deeply ingrained German "problem" with money. For Zatlin, the GDR's attempt to create a Communist utopia rested on eliminating the critical role of money. Despite these efforts, the leaders of the GDR, most notably Erich Honecker, ironically ended up creating the conditions for socialism's implosion. Perhaps the leaders of the GDR should have known better, having placed the picture of Karl Marx on the East German 100-mark note. As Marx feared, nothing distorted individuals and society like the power of money.

Zatlin skillfully weaves a powerful and original interdisciplinary explanation of the collapse of East Germany. Economic historians, political scientists, and students of Germany will all find something of interest and value in this book. Zatlin's account of the interplay of politics, economics, and culture meticulously recaptures the confusing and contradictory attempts of the leaders of the GDR to control and regulate the use of money. He has reviewed in painstaking detail the official archives of the GDR, and also draws on interviews with key actors, revealing a portrait of the East German leadership trapped in an almost impossible task of controlling the GDR economy. If money (in the form of hard currency) makes the world go around, it was money in the form of the Deutschmark that made the GDR run aground. Attempts to harness market forces and hard currency (for example, through the Intershop system) merely served to undermine the moral and ethical status of the government's appeal to egalitarianism and social justice. At almost every step in the planning of the East German economy (Zatlin's primary focus is on the Honecker era), the party leaders found themselves confronting the failures of key policies, compounded by earlier failures. Examples of the hypocrisy of their policy formulations in the name of "real existing socialism" are too numerous to mention (Zatlin's book cites many).

Moreover, for those of us who followed the role of the Deutschmark in locking in German unification in July 1990, Zatlin illuminates the critical role of citizen petitions, showing how they steeled the courage of an East German public ready to appeal to authority and ultimately turn their back on it. It is not surprising, then, that Kohl's aggressive embrace of parity—which was intended in part to secure political control over the emerging and fast-changing reunification process (and a future all-German

government) and also to stem the tide of refugees to the west—found such a receptive ear in the East. Whether one agreed with his 1:1 proposal (and the Bundesbank was none too pleased), it was the final nail in the coffin of the East German system. The Deutschmark had finally come to East Germany. In another ironic twist, the West German government with its capitalist system was now set to “equalize” the two Germanys (in terms of the exchange of Ostmarks for Deutschmarks)—something the East German socialists could never quite manage.

There is very little to criticize in this book. Given Zatlin’s historical approach, the book is, not surprisingly, long and detailed (348 pages of text). Perhaps some material might have been condensed. For example, Chapter 5, titled “The Vehicle of Desire,” could have been integrated into Chapter 6, dealing with consumerist ideology. These two chapters appear the most like parts of a dissertation project—interesting, illustrative to a point, and well-written but longer than they need to be to support the author’s argument. One might also contend that the book is a bit short on a larger explanatory theory. At times, the author does bring into his analysis various analytical frameworks; for example, citing Albert Hirschman’s exit option theory or Marxist-socialist monetary theory (all used appropriately at the right moment in the book). However, the book lacks an overarching framework to explain the demise of the East German system. Was it political culture, social movements, power politics, or interparty bureaucratic struggles that brought down the regime? One could counter that the end of the regime has no one “best” explanation, and, indeed, Zatlin carefully stitches together a unique multiple-level understanding and interpretation of East German economic history and its collapse.

One might also argue that the demise of the East German regime was more about markets than about money or culture. In the end, the markets—relentless, unyielding, and uncontrollable—brought down the GDR. Despite efforts to eliminate the price mechanism as a functioning element of economic planning, supply and demand would in the end put a “price” on nearly everything in the GDR, including the price of freedom. This basic reality brought on the collapse of the GDR and lives on in the turmoil of uneven economic development in the eastern parts of unified Germany.



Ethan Pollock, *Stalin and the Soviet Science Wars*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006. 269 pp. \$35.00.

Reviewed by James T. Andrews, Iowa State University

Ethan Pollock has produced a cogent, elegantly written analysis of Soviet knowledge, science, and power in 1945–1953, the era of high Stalinism and the dawn of the Cold War. The book is based on prodigious archival research in Russia, drawing on thousands of documents from the former Central Party Archive (now known as the Russian State Archive for Socio-Political History) in Moscow. Pollock focuses on Iosif Sta-

lin's intervention in scholarly debates within six disciplines—philosophy, agricultural science, physics, linguistics, physiology, and economics—and shows that Stalin was far more concerned about scholarly ideas than was previously known. These issues, according to Pollock, were crucial to the Communist Party's legitimacy, and the debates also reflected a Russocentric patriotism in the post-1945 era, as well as a pervasive xenophobia and "anti-cosmopolitanism." Pollock explains how the scholarly disputes were administered by the party and how Stalin himself tried to encourage debate while simultaneously contributing essays or settling disputes either overtly or in a subtle manner behind the scenes.

The book begins with an analysis of how the Soviet political and scientific elite maneuvered to attack Georgii Aleksandrov's *History of Western European Philosophy* (and the philosophical discipline in general) for purportedly overstating the degree to which European philosophers influenced Marxism. Communist Party officials argued that philosophers such as Aleksandrov needed to emphasize how Russian thought played a central role in the history of philosophy—a Russocentric approach that characterized postwar Stalinism, as Pollock shows in chapter two. He turns in chapter three to the insidious Lysenko affair in biology in 1948 that crushed the field of Soviet agricultural genetics. Pollock to some extent borrows from the work of other scholars such as Kirill Rossianov, who previously analyzed how Stalin edited Trofim Lysenko's work, and it is not always clear what is specifically new about Pollock's analysis. Pollock reformulates the notion that Stalin edited Lysenko's speeches and thus oversaw the nefarious campaign against genetics that deemphasized "class" and replacing it with words such as "reactionary" or "idealistic." The first part of the book concludes in chapter four with an analysis of the physics debates during this era. Pollock argues that the 1948 Agricultural Academy session dramatically shifted the ideological battleground in physics. Soviet defenders of the new physics of relativity and quantum mechanics could be seen as "unpatriotic" as well as "idealistic." Pollock believes that anti-Semitism also played a part in the criticisms of physicists in the Academy of Sciences. He contends that there "was a tendency for patriotic, university-based physicists to ally with philosophers critical of modern physical theories" (p. 81). Certain Academy physicists, such as Igor Kurchatov, who headed the scientific portion of the nuclear bomb project, eventually lobbied the regime against a Lysenko-style conference to chastise Academy-based physicists. In the end, according to Pollock, the Academy-based physicists were saved by their usefulness to the regime's nuclear weapons project—an argument that was exhaustively made by David Holloway in his monumental *Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1938–1956* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994).

The second half of Pollock's book deals with three disciplinary debates: in physiology, linguistics, and political economy. In chapter six, Pollock analyzes the 1950 Pavlov sessions that were highly coordinated by the Soviet science section under Yuri Zhdanov. The Politburo, in this case, was heavy-handed in defending Pavlov's theory that conditioned reflexes provided the guide to understanding all complex human and animal behavior. Pollock shows in this chapter how party leaders wanted the Pavlov celebrations to be more divisive than the actual physiologists who preferred (at least

initially) to show some unity in their field. Eventually Stalin gave Zhdanov full endorsement and advice on how, in Stalin's words, to "attack the detractors with certainty of total success" (p. 146). Probably the most original chapters are five and seven, which delineate the academic debates in linguistics and political economy respectively. Though chapter five borrows from Ernest J. Simmons's edited volume published in 1951, Pollock convincingly shows how Stalin's own article in June 1950 on "Marxism and Linguistics" brought a "monumental, but ambiguous, shift in Soviet efforts to understand the relationship between Party ideology and knowledge" (p. 123). Here Stalin tried desperately to show his expertise in Marxism while he critiqued the eminent Soviet linguist Nikolai Yakovlevich Marr. Although Pollock shows how Stalin's article still left open disputes about language in the USSR, he is less convincing in showing the seriousness with which linguists or Soviet citizens actually respected Stalin's intellectual forays. The book ends with an overview of the economic debates in chapter seven titled "Everyone Is Waiting." Pollock shows that contrary to other fields like philosophy, Stalin tried to remove propaganda from economists' work and emphasize instead the scientific basis of their field. As in his discussion of linguistics, Pollock here documents how Stalin suddenly intervened and thus altered the work of professional economists in the USSR.

At times while reading this book, one wonders whether Pollock's tremendous archival research hovers over the work and thus becomes a referential substitute for some broader, more penetrating analytical and theoretical framework for understanding how science and knowledge were administered (and received) up and down the bureaucratic ladder in Stalin's time. Furthermore, Pollock might more clearly have shown how his work differs from other scholars' methodological approaches when dealing with similar issues. Consider Nikolai Kremmentsov's *Stalinist Science* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996). Unlike Pollock, Kremmentsov takes a more rhetorical approach and actually shows how some scientists played elaborate games with the Soviet science apparatus only to reemerge in a different light after Stalin's death. Sometimes groups of scientists, and Soviet society as a base itself, get lost in Pollock's narrative of Stalin's top-down engineering of Soviet ideological debates. Finally, one wonders whether Pollock's analysis leaves us more with a detailed understanding of Stalin's megalomaniacal vision of himself as "scholar/theoretician" in ubiquitous fields, and thus sheds light not as much on how serious Stalin took his own scientific interventions but on how most Soviet academics seemed, as Pollock's evidence suggests, powerless to evade Stalin's forays into their fields.

These criticisms aside, Pollock has written a lucid, thought-provoking, and comprehensive synopsis of the major scientific debates of the post-WWII era. His notion of Stalin as the "coryphaeus" of science—"leader of the chorus"—provides the reader with an interesting framework to understand how post-WWII scientists "sang in rhythm" to Stalin's choreographed debates. Even though Pollock's notion that Stalin actually cultivated true "scientific debate" is not fully convincing, the book provides an in-depth look at how Stalin as political leader was probably the only one able to keep up with his own evolving notions of scientific and party-dictated truth. This book provides scholars and students the most-elaborate overview of the party's (and

Stalin's) interference in academic fields during high Stalinism and will thus be of great interest to those interested in the political and intellectual history of the USSR and the history of scientific thought at the dawn of the Cold War.



Hiroaki Kuromiya, *The Voices of the Dead: Stalin's Great Terror in the 1930s*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007. 304 pp. \$30.00.

Reviewed by Simon Ertz, Stanford University

In this ambitious and multifaceted book, Hiroaki Kuromiya endeavors to reconstruct the experiences of “ordinary” victims of the Great Terror in the Soviet Union of the late 1930s. Through a close reading of their case files, he seeks to retrieve what he calls the “true voices” of several dozen randomly selected individuals who were arrested, interrogated, and (with few exceptions) executed by the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD) in the “mass operations” from summer 1937 to autumn 1938 in Kiev. Even though various scholars, including Kuromiya, have much expanded our knowledge of the background, chronology, and mechanics of the Great Terror in recent years, no one has previously offered as meticulous an examination of individual interrogation records. Whenever the longhand interrogation protocols have been preserved, Kuromiya has analyzed them because they often exhibit revealing differences from the typed versions. He has carefully attended not only to the content and the dynamics of the interrogations but also to lacunae, internal contradictions, and marginalia in the files. He has ingeniously traced additional background information about his subjects, and he has aptly contextualized their fates within the broader social and political context of the 1930s.

Although Kuromiya's skills in analyzing and interpreting these sources are truly impressive, several blind spots remain. The most obvious concerns concrete interrogation procedures, particularly the use of threats, deceit, and physical and psychological torture as described in scores of memoirs of repression victims. Because almost all of Kuromiya's subjects had not even a chance to record their experiences and because their files remain silent on this issue, Kuromiya in most cases can only suspect the use of such practices whenever the interrogated started to confess—gradually, partially, and often in formulaic language—to deeds they in all likelihood had never committed.

Despite such limitations, Kuromiya succeeds in providing remarkably diverse and detailed insights into the core of the machinery of the Great Terror. Thirteen chapters, each of which sketches out the cases of several individuals targeted for a particular reason, illustrate the broad spectrum of factors that could trigger persecution. The reader encounters persons who had occasionally grumbled about the multiple hardships of everyday life, who had too conspicuously held on to religious practices, who had failed to break away from doomed relatives and loved ones, who had been induced to cooperate with the NKVD but had failed to offer satisfactory intelligence, or

who simply bore the wrong surname (as happened to one Leonid Pavlovich Trotskii). One theme running through many stories is alleged links to foreign powers, which supports Oleg Khlevniuk's and Kuromiya's earlier arguments about the significance of the foreign policy factor for explaining the timing and the nature of the mass terror of 1937–1938. The grounds for such suspicions were diverse: Polish or Korean ethnicity, any interaction with foreign consulates or their personnel, family members living abroad, or simply the marginality of one's existence, which, in the eyes of the regime, increased one's vulnerability to recruitment attempts by foreign secret services.

Had the Soviet leadership any serious reasons for such apprehensions? Kuromiya's cases vividly illustrate that discontent and grievances were not uncommon in the 1930s in Kyiv and beyond. How could it have been otherwise given the horrors of collectivization and the subsequent famines, the persistent shortages and frustrations that characterized everyday life, the Soviet system's perennial encroachment on the lifeworlds of ordinary people, lingering memories, idealized or not, of better times under the Tsar, and the suspicion that, across the Western border, life might be more bearable under regimes that appeared to be fundamental alternatives to Bolshevism? And yet, not in a single case that Kuromiya examined did the NKVD assemble plausible evidence, much less proof that any of its victims had engaged in activities that would have come anywhere close to a serious opposition, let alone threat, to the regime.

Precisely because of the width of this gap between what the interrogators were supposed to find and what the interrogated could and were prepared to admit, excavating the latter's "true," undistorted "voices" from the police files is an extremely difficult endeavor, as Kuromiya himself frequently acknowledges. Hence, one might more accurately say that his efforts often result in uncovering the recalcitrance with which the vast majority of victims, even under extreme duress, fought the interrogators' attempts to entangle them in a web of insidious and often fantastic accusations. Indeed, among Kuromiya's most striking findings is the frequency with which interrogators failed to bring their victims to confess to their alleged crimes. If self-incriminations were nonetheless extracted, they were typically flimsy and undercut by the accompanying documentation. As a result, when NKVD officials typed up the handwritten protocols and prepared them for the (sham) trial, they would often ascribe to their victims statements they had never made and to conceal the victims' continued professions of innocence.

These findings directly point to the fundamental dilemma of Soviet terror. If the terror meted out by the Bolsheviks and brought to its culmination by Iosif Stalin is to be understood as an attempt to install and solidify a total, revolutionary order by means of the removal of any competing concepts of order (whether of prerevolutionary or foreign provenience), then the inconsistencies, contradictions, and implausible assertions pervading the police files attest to at least a partial failure. At the critical moment when unruly and inimical "elements" were not simply numbers in operational documents or propagandistic categories and stereotypes—and were instead to be unmistakably identified from among living human beings—the executive organs of the party-state ran into obstacles that even violence could not overcome. To

be sure, a death sentence in the Soviet Union did not need to stem from a truthful and logically consistent verdict—unchecked power and the resolve to use it were fully sufficient. Moreover, public announcements about the identification and punishment of “enemies” were stylized and hence much more coherent than the secret police files. Yet it is telling that even though the NKVD could and did routinely practice torture as well as the manipulation and falsification of documents, it still left behind many records that, rather than corroborating the regime’s assumptions about the abundance of enemies, are full of contradictions. Thus, the Great Terror, far from producing the desired absolute, ultimate order, instead sowed disorder, upheaval, and confusion in the lives of millions and even in internal documents.

All these achievements aside, the present book is also an attempt to restore a small part of the memory of the otherwise anonymous masses of “ordinary” terror victims. Here, too, it succeeds as much as the sources allow. Kuromiya’s subtle and careful reconstruction of the fates of his subjects, supplemented by excerpts from their interrogation protocols and several moving “mug shots,” allow the perceptive reader to develop a sense for what it meant for these people to see their lives shattered in the face of outlandish and unfailingly fatal accusations.

One might surmise that the very fact that Kuromiya was permitted access to the NKVD files in Kyiv leaves room for hope that at least in Ukraine the crimes committed by the Soviet party-state will not soon be forgotten—the more so in times when Ukrainian politicians are anxious to gain international recognition of the famine of the early 1930s as an act of genocide. The same cannot be said about today’s Russia. Finally, never should one forget the selectiveness of commemoration, as illustrated by Omer Bartov’s almost simultaneously published book *Erased: Vanishing Traces of Jewish Galicia in Present-Day Ukraine* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), which documents how in Western Ukraine, traces not only of the Shoah, but also of any previous Jewish presence are being rapidly expunged, sometimes to be replaced by nationalistic imagery.



Patricia Kennedy Grimsted, F. J. Hoogewoud, and Eric Ketelaar, eds., *Returned from Russia: Nazi Archival Plunder in Western Europe and Recent Restitution Issues*. Builth Wells, Wales: Institute of Art and Law Ltd., 2007. xxii + 349 pp. £28.00.

Reviewed by Peter B. Maggs, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Returned from Russia starts with a 132-page introduction by Patricia Kennedy Grimsted chronicling the plunder of archives by Nazi Germany, the taking of the plundered archives by Soviet forces, the relocation of these archives to the USSR, and the long but ultimately largely successful efforts to secure the return of these archives. The book then features chapters by leading archivists from various countries discussing the extended negotiations for the archives’ return. Also included are a number of legal documents pertaining to the restitution process.

During the Second World War, the Nazi authorities plundered archives, books, and art works from major collections in the occupied countries as well as from victims of oppression within Germany. A tiny portion of the plundered archives contained military maps and information. However, the great majority were meant for libraries and museums that were to be created after the German victory.

The victorious Soviet troops seized many archives, books, and art works from Germany. Some were parts of long-standing collections of German institutions. Others had been taken by the Germans from foreign countries and Holocaust victims. Although some of the seizures (e.g., of maps and battle plans) were for lawful Soviet military purposes, most were apparently intended from the beginning to be held for reparations. However, neither Holocaust victims' property nor archives of Allied governments could be proper candidates for retention for reparations. The illegitimate nature of the Soviet seizures led to a long period of secrecy about Soviet holdings. When this secrecy began to lift, the USSR and later Russia found itself in an inexcusable moral situation. At the same time the Russian archivists faced severe resource shortages, which hindered efforts to take inventory, preserve the plundered archives, and prepare for their return.

By the early 1990s, as Grimsted chronicles, nationalist sentiments in Russia led to the passage of legislation that made more difficult the return of cultural valuables. She uses the word "displaced" (in quotes) to describe these treasures. As I have discussed with her, I am not happy with this word choice, which is far too mild to describe such actions as the criminal Nazi and Soviet plunder of Holocaust victims' property. Nor is it an accurate translation of the self-serving term used in the Russian legislation of the 1990s, *peremeshchennyye* (relocated), a word lacking the implication of "in the wrong place" that is inherent in "displaced" (as in, e.g., "displaced persons").

Each of the chapters on the return of individual archives (to France, to Belgium, to the Netherlands, to Luxembourg, and to the Rothschild Archive) tells a story of complex negotiations. On the West European side, they show a variety of approaches, including some very skillful diplomacy. Occasionally principled disagreements arose. Undoubtedly, for instance, the taking and retention of the records of German forces that had occupied the Netherlands was a lawful act of the victorious Allied armies. However, whether such records belonged to the first Allied country to take them (the Soviet Union) or to the Allied country that they most concerned (the Netherlands) was less clear. Russian authorities generally settled such disputes unilaterally and in their own favor.

On the Russian side, the reader sees well-meaning archivists working under a boorish and miserly government. The results included such inexcusable actions as the release of the Rothschild Archive only on payment of a king's ransom in the form of a collection of letters between Tsar Alexander II and his wife. The Russians also successfully demanded payments of numerous "expenses" as a condition for return of twice-stolen goods. Unfortunately, much or all of this money never reached the destitute Russian archival institutions.

This short review cannot do justice to the incredible detail in each of the chapters of the book. A relatively small typeface and copious footnotes have allowed *Returned*

from Russia to convey as much information as is contained in many books three times as long. The detail reflects a truly extraordinary amount of work on the part of the various authors.

The book will appeal not just to archivists but to anyone interested in the more general topic of negotiations with Soviet and Russian authorities. Because of the attention paid to the fine points of interactions between the Western European archivists and their Russian counterparts, and to the bigger picture of the changing political situation in Russia, the book should be useful to a broad audience.



J. Arch Getty and Oleg V. Naumov, *Yezhov: The Rise of Stalin's "Iron Fist."* New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008. 283 pp. \$35.00.

Reviewed by Erik Kulavig, University of Southern Denmark

This book is about the making of Nikolai Ivanovich Yezhov (1895–1940) and his generation of Bolsheviks. The narrative stops short of the height of his career during the “Great Terror” (1936–1938), when he was head of the secret police (NKVD) and second only to Iosif Stalin himself.

The authors warn us that their book is not only about the main protagonist but also, through him, about two decades of Soviet history and especially the origins of Stalinism. The book thus deals not so much with individual actors as with structures. The authors stress their revisionist line by speaking against the “traditional” view, which in their somewhat simplistic interpretation claims that “Stalin ruled everything” As they see it, Yezhov was neither a blank page nor a robot but an acting subject who was “intelligent, hardworking, committed and able to manipulate even his master.” Along with all other loyal servants of the Soviet regime, he did carry out Stalin’s policies, but he also pursued his own interests “as far it was possible within the limits of Stalin’s general line.” The implementation of policies, the authors say, is just as important as the formulation. This is one of many statements of general truths that at first glance look acceptable but that in a Stalinist context are not: No one would have dared to put to death anyone without Stalin’s general consent.

A second theme concerns the “traditional perception” that Yezhov was nothing but an invention of Stalin. According to the authors, their main character made his way through the system and to the very top on his own by learning the rules of the game; that is, by learning how to maneuver in the matrix of personal relationships or in a personalized system.

The third theme running through the book touches on the complicated problem of whether Stalin and his entourage actually believed what they said and did. Were they in other words true Communists rather than brutal cynics pursuing personal power for the sake of power only? The authors are not in doubt: Stalin and the others were all strong believers. This perspective yields little space for dissent and opposition

and thereby for the role and understanding of the terror. To the authors the Soviet system was first of all self-sustained.

According to the authors, the Bolsheviks' character was formed by a mixture of the late Tsarist state's brutal oppression of the working class and the Manichean tradition of Russian orthodoxy. This cocktail of class warfare and cultural history downplays the element of brutal force carried out by the Soviet leadership.

Getty and Naumov argue that Yezhov was a self-made man and a radical Bolshevik from the very start. In that respect they oppose other biographers who deny Yezhov's radicalism and active participation in the October Revolution. The authors here rely too heavily on Yezhov's autobiography for this reviewer's taste.

Getty and Naumov believe that the Russian civil war was a very important factor in the genesis of the political outlook and mentalities that would support Stalinism. Everything during the civil war was interpreted in terms of a binary conception of class opposition: friend versus enemy, us versus them, worker versus saboteur. Seen from this perspective, all problems were caused by people with bad intentions—that is, by enemies of the people—and formal rights, procedures, and laws had no place in a world in which what was good and right was already known. Without doubt, the crimes committed by the Bolsheviks during the civil war created a dependency that later made it impossible for them to leave the bloody journey they had commenced, but one should not forget that other mentalities were at play also; for example, the moderate socialists, who had a genuine backing in the masses but who were ruthlessly fought by the Bolsheviks.

Getty and Naumov reinvent Moshe Lewin's old idea about the "rural nexus." That is, most of the loyal cadres of factory workers and soldiers had been killed during the civil war, and the Bolsheviks had to build socialism in a hostile environment of primitive peasants. Or, as Lewin put it, the masses became a burden to Vladimir Lenin. This interpretation presupposes that workers believed in the socialist project. Readers who do not share this assumption might instead see Lenin as the burden on society and might believe that, much more than the mentalities of the masses, the practical and moral impossibility of the Bolshevik utopia was the core of the Soviet tragedy.

Getty and Naumov want to explain the Stalinist system and not merely accumulate a catalog of atrocities. This reviewer has great sympathy for their ambition but feels they run the risk of rationalizing something that cannot be rationalized. Yezhov, as depicted by Getty and Naumov, was a regular guy with special talents and ambitions who would have risen to the top of any organization. But in fact the Soviet Union was not just any political system that can be understood by rational standards. The USSR was a utopian construct that the political leadership attempted to impose on society through ruthless violence. It thus carried the cruelty inside itself. Because this point is not acknowledged by the authors or by any other revisionist, something important is missing from their explanations. If one focuses on Yezhov's talents and efficiency without saying what he was actually doing and without evaluating what his actions meant to the citizens of the utopian state, one is on the wrong track.

Yezhov, despite having as its subject a most murderous man in a highly murder-

ous environment, manages instead to be about the technology of career-making in Stalin's Russia. Few traces of blood are found on its pages.



Alexei Yurchak, *Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More: The Last Soviet Generation*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006. 256 pp.

Reviewed by Christoph Neidhart, Süddeutsche Zeitung (Munich)

From the advent of the Cold War, Western perceptions of the Soviet Union were shaped by dichotomies. The West distinguished dissidents from sympathizers of the regime, victims from oppressors, and anti-Communists from Communists (or, to speak in terms of today's politics, good from evil). The victims bore labels such as "democrats" and were considered to be "on our side," while the "Communists" were enemies of the "free world." The manipulated masses might have been a third category. The Western world treated them as unwitting victims of the regime too.

The Soviet Union is history, but the dichotomous view of its society prevails—the more so because many Soviet citizens seemed to confirm this dualism. They would talk about "my" and "oni," "we" and "they." Usually, they did not define their "my," or "we," its nature was understood—and fluid, as was the nature of their "oni," or "they." "They" meant "the others," the Communist Party, the secret police, or, in today's simplified political lexicon, the bad guys.

Working at a Western newspaper in Moscow during the final period of the Soviet Union, this reviewer initially found the categories of "my" and "oni" highly confusing. "My" was a different group for different people and different at different times. Someone could belong to someone else's "my" but through a change of subject during a conversation suddenly become part of that person's "oni." The categories were fuzzy; the dichotomies depended on the context.

With the end of the Soviet Union, many Russian academics who had been perfectly adapted and loyal to the system (e.g., with good professional jobs) tried to portray themselves as lifelong "dissidents." To this Westerner in Moscow, they seemed insincere. A dissident, according to the Western cliché, was someone who actively opposed the regime. It was difficult to consider someone a dissident for reading forbidden literature, listening to rock music, and telling jokes about the Communist party.

Where within the West's simplified scheme of black-and-white should one place people who hated the uneducated old bureaucrats in the Kremlin or dreamed of a post-Communist Russia (or, in the republics, of an independent country) but who worked as university professors or at prestigious institutions such as television stations? Obviously, they were part of the system, though they could convince this reviewer of their deep-seated disagreement with the system. What about the younger people who neither conformed to nor opposed the system but reduced their involvement with it to a minimum? Many people managed to straddle both spaces, the

official realm of the regime and the atmosphere of the dissident. Others tried to stay out of any seemingly established space.

Thus, the social categories and prejudices with which the Western media looked at Soviet society did not match the reality on the ground. Alexei Yurchak's excellent study *Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More*, sheds light on the conflicting interpretations of late-Soviet society. His book will be an indispensable part of any future historiography of everyday Soviet life.

"Everyone was to some extent complicit in the system of patronage, lying, theft, hedging, and duplicity through which the system operated," Yurchak quotes Susan Gal and Gail Kligman (p. 7). He shows that, as part of this straddling of different worlds, almost everyone was fluent in a range of vernaculars, from the party's newspeak to the lingo of certain subcultures. The *"rusovka"* in particular, loose groupings of like-minded young people devoted to a hobby, often a kind of music, developed their own private linguistic codes. Yurchak labels the ability to converse in different sublanguages "Komsomol Heteroglossia" (p. 217). He introduces Andrei, a young geologist, who after graduation from university entered the Komsomol for the sole reason that the Communist youth league was the one place where he would find easy access to the type of rock music in which he was most interested. Rock music was banned by the party, considered immoral and decadent, and as secretary of a Komsomol committee Andrei gave speeches praising an "uncompromising attitude toward bourgeois ideology and morality." At the same time, he organized rock concerts by amateur bands (p. 217).

Did Andrei mean what he said? Was he aware of his own contradiction? Was he too "naïve and uncritical" (p. 220) to "make a connection between Western music and the politics of anticommunism" (p. 220), Yurchak asks. Or was he a "pure opportunist who [. . .] wore the mask of a Komsomol activist for instrumentalist and careerist reasons."

Yurchak sees Andrei as neither a cynic nor naïve. Official speech in the Soviet Union, according to Yurchak, was devoid of meaning. What Andrei said during a party or at a Komsomol meeting was considered neither to be true nor to be a lie; instead it reproduced the "normalized and fixed structures" (p. 26) of a discourse that was frozen—it mimicked a real political debate. Yurchak stresses that this was the situation for everybody, even the Soviet leaders. "This process of replication took place at the level of texts, the visual discourse of ideology (posters, films, monuments, architecture), ritualistic discourse (meetings, reports, institutional practice, celebrations), and in many centralized 'formal structures' of everyday practice" (p. 26). Yurchak calls this "Soviet authoritative language," which had become "citational and circular at all levels of structure," a "hypernormalized" language. "The process of its normalization did not simply affect all levels of linguistic, textual, and narrative structure but also became an end in itself, resulting in fixed and cumbersome forms of language that were often neither interpreted nor easily interpretable at the level of constative meaning. This shift to hypernormalized language [. . .] is key for our understanding of late socialism" (p. 150). This was, according to Yurchak, as true for the discourse of visual propaganda and rituals as it was for language proper.

Having performed the “rites of Soviet socialism,” young people like Andrei felt free to act counter to their own talk, especially in urban milieus. They did not see themselves as commuters between different subcultures or convictions because what they said in official settings did not mean anything to them or to their audience.

Thus, in late socialism, political discourse was but a performance. “It was no longer read by its audiences literally. [. . .] Therefore, which statements represented “facts” and which did not was relatively unimportant” (p. 76), as Yurchak shows with a thorough linguistic analysis. He argues that in late socialism the poetic function of this ossified authoritative language took center stage. He further shows that this linguistic system might have remained stable if Mikhail Gorbachev had not breached its rules. By introducing an “external editor,” that is, a voice located outside the discourse, Gorbachev undermined the authoritative discourse itself. “It opened up spaces for public discussions *about* authoritative discourse.”

Yurchak, who uses “*svoi*” (ourselves) rather than “*my*,” argues that these word subgroups “were constitutive and indivisible elements of the Soviet system, not its opposites” (p. 288). This, he concludes, helps to explain why the Soviet people saw their system as immutable yet were not really surprised by its collapse. Their everyday discourse had anticipated both outcomes.

This book, with its vast body of anthropological material, as well as Yurchak’s insight and innovative theory, is essential reading for anybody studying totalitarian societies.



Helena Goscilo and Andrea Lanoux, eds., *Gender and National Identity in Twentieth-Century Russian Culture*. De Kalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 2006. 257 pp. \$38.00 cloth; \$22.50 paper.

Reviewed by Rochelle Goldberg Ruthchild, The Union Institute & University

A striking Chagall-like cover masking and unmasking the naked truth about twentieth-century Russian notions of gender and national identity invites the reader into this book, which is ambitious in its sweep. The editors set the tone with their opening essay aptly titled “Lost in the Myths.” Covering several centuries’ worth of “dichotomized gender stereotypes” in Russia and other countries, they cite among others Sigmund Freud, Yuri Lotman, and the feminist critics who specialize in dichotomy deconstruction, such as Hélène Cixous and Luce Irigaray. Noting with dismay the invisibility of gender in most recent works on Russian nationalism and state formation, Helena Goscilo and Andrea Lanoux rightly argue that such “a vital component of national identity” cannot be ignored (p. 9). They contrast this gap with the extensive literature outside Slavic studies on the gendered division between the masculine state and the feminine nation. The insights of this scholarship can be aptly applied to Russia, as in the contrast between the male pantheon of post-Catherine imperial, Soviet,

and post-Soviet leaders and the images of the genuine Mother Russia, or Moist Mother Earth, the soil that “doubled as both womb and tomb” (p. 3).

This ten-essay collection ranges far and wide, as if trying to make up in one volume for previous neglect of the topic. Goscilo’s penetrating examination of the multiple layers of public widowhood in Russia covers a great deal, including peasant imagery, popular culture, and iconic figures such as Anna Akhmatova, the widow as nation. Nadezhda Mandelstam, argues Goscilo, “combine[d] tradition and revolution in anomalous ways” (p. 65); the responses to Elena Bonner’s shepherding of Andrei Sakharov’s legacy reflect the diminished status of the widow in the post-Soviet period. Elizabeth Jones Hemenway surveys the 1920s memorial literature about prominent women Communists, concluding that such portraits honored their sacrifice while “constructing their saintly profiles to fit within the emerging portrait of the period’s rhetorically proclaimed Soviet national family” (p. 88). Lilya Kaganovsky critiques Nikolai Ekk’s 1931 film *The Road to Life* for its racism, coded homosexuality, and power/pleasure dynamic. Two essays address the post-Stalin period. Elena Prokhorova focuses on the Brezhnev era and the image of Soviet masculinity “after the Father” (p. 131). Michele Rivkin-Fish perceptively addresses the framing of Russia’s “demographic crisis” from Leonid Brezhnev to Vladimir Putin.

The editors wisely include a discussion of the structure of the Russian language as the lead essay. Valentina Zaitseva, in her insightful “National, Cultural, and Gender Identity in the Russian Language,” examines genderlect, “how the grammatical category of gender operates on various linguistic levels to contribute to both a unifying sense of national identity and a deep social divide between Russian men and women” (p. 30).

Language, both Russian and English, is very much the point here. Although some of the essays are jargon-heavy, the level of writing overall is quite impressive. Witty turns of phrase abound; puns are peppered throughout the volume.

The book reflects a healthy range of perspectives. In a provocative whirlwind tour of the application of the prostitution archetype to the post-Soviet world, Eliot Borenstein demonstrates how “the metaphorical prostitute disseminates ideology as a kind of ‘textually transmitted disease’” (p. 190). Countering Borenstein’s bleakness, Yana Hashamova in her survey of post-Soviet cinema postulates “a new dynamic that, however timidly, pushes against the traditional patriarchal structure” by showing “a decisive female presence, powerful mothers, and successful female professionals” (p. 197). Hashamova argues for the evolution of film themes since the Soviet collapse, from the chaos of the early years to the emergence of a new social order marked by “a greater variety of female roles and a traumatic adjustment of men to the most recent social changes” (p. 196). In a survey of the largely male homosexual public scene in St. Petersburg and Moscow, Luc Beaudoin stresses a theme common to many of the essays, that “the Soviet idealized model of gender equality has largely disintegrated, replaced with the hypermasculinized culture of sexual consumption” (p. 235). Despite overwhelming evidence of deep homophobia among Russians, Beaudoin is optimistic that gays and lesbians will ultimately be accepted, “wearing their gendered cloak in the nationalist fashion show with pride” (p. 236).

Many of the essays discuss popular culture. In doing so, they largely reflect the attitudes of the elite opinion-makers, public intellectuals, and media figures concentrated in Russia's two largest cities. Such an emphasis may be unavoidable, but it can also obscure and overly simplify the multilayered culture of a country that spans eleven time zones.

This caveat aside, Goscilo and Lanoux are to be commended for their excellent volume. One hopes that the scholarship presented here will spur further research and writing on this highly significant subject.



Wilfried Loth, *Die Sowjetunion und die deutsche Frage: Studien zur sowjetischen Deutschlandpolitik von Stalin bis Chruschtschow*. Göttingen, Germany: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 2007. 318 pp. €24.90.

Reviewed by Peter Grieder, University of Hull (UK)

In 1994 the German historian Wilfried Loth published his highly controversial book *Stalins ungeliebtes Kind* [Stalin's Unloved Child], which argued, on the basis of newly released East German sources, that the Soviet dictator and his immediate successors had never wanted a separate Communist state in the east and instead had sought a united, liberal democratic, and neutral Germany. Thirteen years later, Loth has written a second book, based largely on Soviet sources, reaffirming the main conclusions of the first. He cites documents from six Moscow archives, the most important being the archive of the Russian Foreign Ministry, the State Archive for Socio-Political History (the former Central Party Archive), and the Presidential Archive. Fifteen translated documents pertaining to the genesis of the so-called Stalin Note in March 1952 and excerpts from the remarks of Soviet Prime Minister Georgii Malenkov on 2 June 1953, are included in the appendices. These run to 67 pages and should prove invaluable to historians. However, as Loth himself concedes on page 70, he did not gain access to the archives of the Russian Defense Ministry and the state security organs.

The book is divided into nine chapters: Stalin, the German question and the German Democratic Republic (GDR); planning during the Second World War; the German question at the end of the war; the road to division; the foundation of the GDR; the origins of the Stalin Note; the end of a legend; the 17 June 1953 uprising in international context; and Stalin, Beria, and Khrushchev. Six of the chapters appeared as articles or chapters in edited volumes a few years ago. Three others are original pieces. All are thoroughly researched, highly informative, and well written. Chapters 2 and 3 are particularly impressive, demonstrating that until late March 1945 Iosif Stalin wanted to split Germany into a number of states. Chapter 7 is also convincing, dispensing with Hermann Graml's argument that Stalin's offer to reunify Germany as a neutral country (the so-called Stalin Note of 10 March 1952) was nothing more than a propaganda stunt.

As far as the secondary literature is concerned, one important book is missing

from the bibliography: Dirk Spilker's *The East German Leadership and the Division of Germany: Patriotism and Propaganda, 1945–1953* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006). Spilker's book appeared the year before *Die Sowjetunion und die deutsche Frage* went to press, probably too late to be included. The omission is unfortunate because Spilker convincingly refutes Loth's central thesis and his book is destined to become an authoritative work on the subject.

Contrary to Loth's assertion in the introduction (p. 8), the Soviet sources do not necessarily support his main contention that Stalin advocated a united, liberal democratic, and neutral Germany in the first decade after the Second World War. All they show is that the Soviet leader countenanced a united and neutral Germany that was not yet fully Communist. The difference between these two positions is crucial. After all, the GDR itself did not officially become "socialist" until the collectivization of agriculture had been completed in 1960. Until then the GDR was officially deemed to be in a period of transition. Malenkov's statement to a delegation of GDR leaders on 2 June 1953 that Germany should become a "bourgeois-democratic republic" with a constitution similar to that of the Weimar Republic (pp. 218–219, 302) hardly corroborates Loth's argument. After all, East Germany's 1949 constitution also resembled that of Weimar but served as a fig leaf for totalitarianism.

What Loth fails to grasp is that Stalin and his immediate successors (with the possible exception of Lavrentii Beria, the Soviet minister of internal affairs from March to June 1953) favored a united and neutral Germany only if it was run by a left-wing government committed to the building of Soviet-style socialism. If such a government could be freely elected, so much the better from their point of view, but elections were only a tactical means to secure long-term Soviet control of the country. Therefore, the "democratic" Germany envisaged by Stalin was not, as Loth claims (p. 16), compatible with the Western idea of democracy.

Moscow's vision seems to have been of a Communist-led government radically implementing the stipulations in the August 1945 Potsdam Agreement regarding decartelization, demilitarization, and denazification. These were seen by Marxist-Leninists as essential if the sources of war in Germany—monopoly capitalism and the Junker landowners in Prussia—were to be destroyed. The Soviet Union's tool was the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED), founded in the Soviet occupation zone in late April 1946. Mainly the product of a forced merger of the Social Democratic Party and the Communist Party, the SED was initially pledged to pursue a "special German road to socialism" based on parliamentary democracy. This was deemed necessary because the Western allies controlled two-thirds of the country. Stalin never ruled out the option of turning the Soviet occupation zone into a separate Communist state in the east, but doing so was his minimum agenda and least favorable scenario. This, however, was what he got, partly because his methods undermined his aims and partly because the Western powers had a very different vision. On 7 October 1949, the GDR was born, four-and-a-half months after the Federal Republic of Germany was founded in the West.

Die Sowjetunion und die deutsche Frage is detailed, lucid, thought-provoking, well structured, and based on fascinating source material. Whatever one thinks of its cen-

tral thesis, the book will be required reading for all students of Soviet policy toward Germany from 1945 to 1955.



Theodore Hamerow, *Why We Watched: How Anti-Semitism in the Allied Nations Allowed Hitler to Exterminate European Jewry*. New York: W.W. Norton, 2008. 498 pp.

Reviewed by Helen Fein, Institute for the Study of Genocide and Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.

To begin by conforming to the Truth-in-Reviewing Act, I am uncomfortable reviewing a book whose thesis resembles one I put forth in a book published three decades ago—*Accounting for Genocide: National Responses and Jewish Victimization during the Holocaust* (New York: Free Press, 1979)—which is not cited by Theodore Hamerow. But my theses and methodology were more subtle, and many other exemplary secondary works are not cited either. Although I am generally in sympathy with Hamerow's thesis, I wish he had used more sources and had not made so many errors.

The errors start with his causal linkage. "Throughout Europe there was a rough but close correlation between anti-Semitic prejudice and the relative size of the Jewish community. The greater the proportion of Jews, the greater the hostility they were likely to arouse" (p. 69). In *Accounting for Genocide*, I found that both political anti-Semitism and Jewish victimization were better correlated with the visibility of the Jewish community (the percentage of Jews in the capital or in the major city having the most Jews) than with the relative size of the Jewish population. Hamerow repeats the relationship between "intensity of anti-Semitic prejudice in any given country and the relative proportion of the Jews in that country who perished during the Second World War" (p. 328) without looking at the deviant cases (e.g., the Netherlands, with low anti-Semitism and high victimization) or the chain of Jewish victimization that determined how Jews were caught. This latter point is explicated in my *Accounting for Genocide*, where I also showed how behaviors of state and social institutions—the church, resistance movements, and so forth—saved Jews.

Besides conceptual errors, Hamerow's book is marred by factual errors. The caption for one of the photographs in the book says that "Albert Einstein with Rabbi Stephen Wise and the author Thomas Mann in May 1938 . . . urged the Roosevelt administration to take action to stop the genocide of the Jews in Nazi-occupied Europe." But in fact they could not possibly have made any such protest in May 1938 because the genocide did not begin until 1941 (or 1939 if we take the earliest estimate cited at Adolf Eichmann's trial). On page 189, Hamerow identifies Kristallnacht as a "wave of mass riots encouraged by the authorities" rather than a Nazi state-initiated pogrom in which almost 300 synagogues were burned and 30,000 male Jews interned in concentration camps.

Important omissions also arise, including the role of Secretary of Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Jr., in supervising preparation of a report to President Franklin Roose-

velt (first titled “Report of the Secretary on the Acquiescence of the Government in the Murder of the Jews”) that led to the creation of the U.S. War Refugee Board in January 1944. Hamerow does not consider what could have been done if this effort had begun earlier.

Hamerow’s conclusion that the “decision to adopt genocide as the only way of solving the ethnic problem” was transformed by the war and the “rising sense of frustration and apprehension among the leaders of the Hitler regime [which] found an outlet in their decision to exterminate the Jews, who were held to be ultimately responsible for the growing danger confronting Germany” (p. 293) is hard to take seriously, seeming as it does to depict genocide as an instance of the frustration-aggression hypothesis. Hamerow does not discuss the contending views about the origin of the Final Solution. Nor does he cite any of the original sources regarding the number said to have perished (p. 453), an almost impossible number to estimate with such precision. Moreover, he denies or at least obfuscates the genocide of the Gypsies (p. 454).

In brief, this is an important but unsatisfactory book. Hamerow concludes that the post–World War II recognition of the Holocaust is a consequence of the disappearance of the “Jewish problem”—Jews are no longer seen as constituting a threat—and the increasing assimilation of Jews in the Western world, particularly in the United States.



Christopher Layne, *The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006, 290 pp.

Reviewed by Bernd Greiner, Hamburg Institute for Social Research (Germany)

If George W. Bush had been an aberration, the problem would have been minor, but he was not an aberration. This is roughly the message conveyed by Christopher Layne’s insightful study of U.S. grand strategy from the 1940s to the present. The book deserves a wide readership because—breaking the mold of the academic mainstream—it conveys a simple, forceful message: namely, that the United States, for the sake of its own future, must break away from its Cold War–era foreign and security policies. A mere improvement of the old ways is not an option for Layne; rather, he calls for totally new policies based on self-restraint and enlightened power sharing.

At first glance, these arguments sound like William Appleman Williams and the 1950s Wisconsin School revisited. Indeed, Layne offers a brilliant summary of this once prominent approach to the study of American history. Three notions stand out in his analysis: First, U.S. strategy is fueled not by the outside world but by America’s self-image. Since the late nineteenth century, leading political and business elites have believed that prosperity and security at home depend on open access to the world’s key regions. In their view, the American way of life and democratic form of government can be safe only in an international system penetrated by U.S. trade, investment, ideals, and values. Second, this fixation on “open doors” around the globe is the bed-

rock of U.S. hegemony, spurring demands for other countries to be run by governments that pursue policies compatible with U.S. interests. Third, the U.S. commitment to transforming the world is ill-founded and self-defeating. Layne argues that the history of powerful empires shows that in the end they all fall into the trap of overextension, unnecessary military entanglements, and excessive interventionism. An anti-hegemonic backlash and counterbalancing strategies are bound to ensue.

Over the last thirty years, scholars such as Daniel Yergin, Michael Hogan, and Melvyn Leffler developed offshoots of this interpretation. From an empirical standpoint, Layne has nothing to add to their nuanced balance sheet of America's preponderance of power since 1945. He does, however, add an additional theoretical dimension—an extension of ideas closely associated with Richard Hofstadter's famous *Harper's Magazine* essay "The Paranoid Style in American Politics." For Hofstadter, paranoia and a pervasive sense of vulnerability are byproducts of American "exceptionalism": American society, he claims, is susceptible to the sense of being alone and perpetually beleaguered because it deems its values and institutions superior to everyone else's. Layne convincingly spells out the long-lasting implications of this ambiguous tradition—that total threats must be countered by total defense and absolute security. Secretary of State Dean Rusk expressed this view in arguing that the United States would be safe "only to the extent that its total environment is safe."

This is the sound of a de-territorialized definition of "national security," of a policy that divorces the concept of security from the territorial defense of the U.S. homeland. Instead of tangible factors such as geography and the distribution of power, security is all about unlimited and open-ended concerns. Threatened potentially by turbulent frontiers anywhere, the United States continuously broadens its defense perimeters, without gaining an inch. In Layne's words, "Each new defensive perimeter is menaced by turmoil on the other side of the line." Unable or unwilling to fix a point beyond which U.S. security interests are not implicated, policymakers yield to threat-inflation and threat-exaggeration, fostering a crusader mentality and political recipes for disaster, the experience of Vietnam notwithstanding.

One might argue that Layne makes too little of this approach. In addition to offering controversial judgments about the Cold War years and a sometimes naive perception of Soviet policy, he offers only a sketchy account to back up his claim that the United States pays a high domestic price for its traditional security policy. The expansion of the national security state, the accretion of power in the imperial presidency, and the diminution of congressional authority in foreign affairs—all these issues are referred to as highly important but are discussed only in passing. This is all the more regrettable in light of the foreign policy alternative suggested. According to Layne, the United States should become an "offshore balancer," retracting its military power from Europe, East Asia, and the Near East and shifting to other major powers the primary responsibility for defense of these areas. What, however, is the domestic setting for such a far-reaching move away from hegemony? What consequences will the United States face at home if it refuses to change course? What should an international security framework based on regional poles of power look like? A single book

cannot provide ready-made answers. But by sidestepping these thorny issues, Layne unnecessarily leaves himself vulnerable to cheap criticism.

Nevertheless, he is to be lauded for a timely and well-argued book. Sooner or later the United States will have to accommodate the rise of new great powers. If it sticks to its master narrative of the “open door” and its Cold War–informed quest for absolute security, it will not only be ill-prepared. Its response to a relative decline will likely be violent, pretty much along the lines of former European empires. Apropos Europe: Should the United States against all odds step down from its hegemonic designs, how can the void be filled?